Линии разлома

Глобальная «песочница» политического и стратегического влияния начинается в сентябре 2026 года и охватывает 500 фиксированных секторов карты: 492 участка суши и 8 соединенных между собой акваторий. У каждого сектора суши есть один правящий субъект; воды являются нейтральными. Государства и де-факто политические сообщества представлены как территориальные фракции, в то время как ООН, ЕС, НАТО и другие международные организации остаются институтами или альянсами, а не владельцами территорий. Игровое поле закреплено за 150 крупными городами и стратегическими объектами. Каждой из названных личностей можно управлять, включая политических лидеров, военачальников, оппозиционных деятелей, дипломатов, промышленных магнатов и локальные военные активы. Начальное состояние соответствует исключительно сентябрю 2026 года: война с Ираном и ее фронты в Персидском заливе и Красном море, конфликт на Украине и соперничество между США и Китаем являются стартовыми условиями, однако никакие будущие события или исходы не предопределены.

Сентябрь 2026 года. Война между Ираном, Соединенными Штатами и Израилем распространилась на весь Персидский залив: иранские удары поразили американские базы и нефтяную инфраструктуру, Ормузский пролив стал ареной боевых действий, а хуситы расширяют фронт в Красном море. Израиль ведет бои на юге Ливана, война России на Украине продолжается, Москва оказывает давление на Европу, а соперничество США и Китая продолжает определять глобальную торговлю и технологии. Цены на энергоносители, транспортные маршруты и международные альянсы находятся под угрозой. Мир начинает игру с реального баланса сил на сентябрь 2026 года; события после этой даты не предрешены.

Activate Hardcore Autonomous World mode. The simulation does not revolve around the player. A. CORE CAUSAL RULES 1. Chain of command: national forces need political authorization for large-scale operations unless a coup is underway. 2. Energy chokepoints: Iran/Houthis closing Hormuz/Bab el-Mandeb raises oil prices and pressures importers. Strikes on Ras Tanura, Kharg Island or Ras Laffan have a similar, localized, faster-recovering effect. 3. Nuclear red line: nuclear states (Russia, US, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, UK, France, North Korea) using nuclear weapons triggers a global board-reshaping response. India–Pakistan clashes or doubt over Pakistan’s arsenal control during its Afghanistan war sharply raise nuclear risk. 4. Non-state groups: RSF, JNIM, ISWAP, Houthis, Hezbollah, M23 and TTP depend on routes/sanctuaries. Cutting routes weakens them gradually; losing a key crossing weakens them immediately. If the Islamic Emirate tolerates TTP sanctuaries, Pakistan retains justification for cross-border operations. 5. Weak legitimacy: transitional governments lose new regions more easily than established ones. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan and Venezuela lose legitimacy if promised elections are delayed; winning restores it; losing risks non-military removal. 6. Bloc switching: a state switching blocs loses much of its former bloc’s support immediately; equivalent new support returns gradually. 7. Taiwan/South China Sea: naval/air incidents raise US–China/global tension, not automatically war. 8. Humanitarian capacity is finite: new major crises reduce existing-response capacity; displacement reduces it further. 9. Russia/Iran/Venezuela sanctions tighten after each military escalation and ease only after verifiable diplomatic gestures, never just with time. 10. Food security: long Black Sea blockades or war-driven crop losses in Sudan/Sahel worsen global food insecurity and reduce humanitarian capacity. 11. North Korea–Russia: North Korean troops strengthen Russia’s front in exchange for technology transfers strengthening North Korea/Kim Jong Un’s leverage. 12. UN Secretary-General: truces/corridors work mechanically only with great-power backing. 13. Kolwezi cobalt: control of the eastern DRC mines finances whoever holds them. M23 control raises military capacity/support; government recapture cuts the flow. 14. Cyber warfare: intensity rises with great-power escalation and can substitute for direct action, especially Russia/US/China/Iran. 15. War fatigue: high fatigue lowers performance and raises morale/legitimacy-collapse risk. 16. Mandatory reporting of casualties for both sides in every engagement 17. Leader profiles, bureaucratic inertia, hybrid warfare, gray zones, shadow economy, event chains (civil war → refugees → tension → crisis). 18. Real-world organizations (NATO, EU, UN, BRICS, AU, CSTO, IMF, SCO, OPEC). B. ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL CYCLES AND ELITE TURNOVER Core democracies and Israel are tracked. Power changes alter foreign/trade/sanctions/monetary policy, alliances/commodities. 1. Triggers only: power changes only via elections, term expiry, snap dissolution, coalition collapse, no-confidence, resignation, party leadership contest, impeachment, death/incapacity. No trigger = continuity; never script outcomes. 2. Calendar (dates only): * Brazil: 4 Oct 2026; runoff 25 Oct if no candidate >50%. * Israel: Knesset 27 Oct 2026. * US: 3 Nov 2026; 435 House + 35 Senate. * France: presidential Apr 2027; snap legislative via dissolution. * Japan: lower house renewed Feb 2026; secure unless own party turns on leader. * Poland/Italy/Spain: by 2027; Argentina: 2027; Australia: by 2028; Germany/UK/Canada/India: by 2029; South Korea: 2030. * Early elections only after collapse/dissolution. 3. Results use legitimacy, inflation/energy/GDP, war fatigue/security shocks, opposition unity, coalition arithmetic and electoral system. Poll leaders can lose; wars/crises may rally or destroy support. 4. Transition lag: US Congress early Jan, Brazil 1 Jan; Germany/Italy/Spain/Poland/Israel need weeks/months of bargaining. Outgoing leaders are constrained. 5. Divided power (US midterm losses, French cohabitation, hung/minority governments) creates gridlock and raises no-confidence risk. 6. Policy speed: fast (days/weeks)—rhetoric, military posture, aid, executive tariffs/sanctions in US/Brazil/Argentina; medium (months)—budgets, fiscal/monetary course, trade/energy policy; slow (years)—treaties/alliances (NATO, EU, Quad, AUKUS), with legal/domestic/partner constraints. Sharp reversals require a clear mandate/few veto points and affect world stats: tariffs/sanctions -> trade/oil/inflation; monetary -> stress; alliances -> tension. Apply A.6. 7. Anticipation: markets/governments react before votes; surprises raise stress; allies hedge, rivals test. 8. Elite turnover: defeated/discredited leaders resign, lose party contests or become opposition: institutional_power falls, influence/network_reach partly remains. New leaders start with fresh legitimacy; inflation/scandals/war costs erode it. Foreign/defense/finance/central-bank changes shift the matching domain. Update entities: outgoing -> opposition/retired; incoming -> active. 9. Other states follow A’s legitimacy/coup/transitional rules. C. ECONOMY C.1 General principles 1. Two layers: world stats describe global conditions; country position = C.3 + leader stats. Never invent country GDP/inflation without a country stat. 2. Every change needs a concrete cause (strike, closure, sanction, election, policy, harvest, season); state it with the change. 3. Per step: prices ≤10–15% normally/≤30% shock; indices ≤5/≤10 points; growth/inflation ≤0.5 pp. 4. Without drivers, stats slowly revert to baseline; shocks fade over several steps. 5. Linked stats must be compatible; contradictions need an offsetting cause; never exceed domain. 6. Lags: energy/food shocks reach inflation in weeks/months; rates affect growth after 6–12 months; sanctions bite as targets reroute/substitute/use shadow trade. C.2 Drivers of world stats * Oil: Up—Hormuz/Bab el-Mandeb closure/attacks, Gulf/Russian/Iranian energy strikes, OPEC+ cuts, Russia/Iran sanctions. Down—recession, demand loss, reserves, reopened routes, sanction relief. Trapped OPEC+ capacity cannot lower price during closure. Oil up -> inflation up, importer growth down; exporter revenue only on exportable volumes. >~$120/bbl sustained -> recession risk sharply up. * Gas (EUR/MWh): Up—Qatar/LNG disruption, Hormuz/Ras Laffan losses, Russian supply loss, low EU storage, extreme weather, Asian LNG demand. Down—reopened routes, mild weather, demand loss, new LNG. Very high prices -> shutdowns, coal switching, caps/subsidies, electricity up. * Food: Up—Black Sea blockade, drought, export bans, fertilizer costs, shipping disruption, grain wars. Down—good harvests/ports. -> unrest/legitimacy loss in Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Sahel; migration up; humanitarian capacity down. * Shipping: Up—ship attacks, naval conflict, Hormuz/Red Sea/Taiwan Strait/Black Sea closures, insurance spikes. Down—escorts/ceasefires. -> freight/energy costs, delays/inflation up; growth down; naval powers gain weight. * Global inflation: Up—energy/food/shipping shocks, tariffs, fiscal expansion, weak currencies. Down—tight money, falling commodities, demand slump. -> rate hikes, stress up, growth down; real-wage loss weakens incumbents. * Global GDP: Up—stable energy, open trade, low stress, stimulus. Down—energy shocks, inflation, tariffs, wars, financial crises, tight money. <0 = global recession: unemployment/protests up, incumbents weaker, defense/aid squeezed. * Financial stress: Up—defaults/bank failures, major-economy sanctions, sharp rates, strong dollar, capital flight, election/tariff shocks. Down—coordinated central banks/clear policy. -> EM currencies weaker, debt crises, investment/growth down. * Global tension: Up—incidents, buildups, sanctions, failed talks. Down—ceasefires/summits. -> defense/alliance cohesion up; trade openness down; oil/financial risk premia up. * Nuclear risk: Up—nuclear rhetoric, strikes near nuclear sites, arms-control failure. -> risk-off, stress up, safe havens stronger. >70: nuclear-state strike sharply moves markets. * Tech competition: Up—export controls, tech sanctions, Taiwan tension. -> supply-chain fragmentation, costs up, blocs/industrial investment; strongest on Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Netherlands, China, US chips. C.3 Country economic profiles * Energy exporters (Gulf, Russia, Iran, Norway, US, Canada): high prices raise revenue/resources only for exportable volumes; Hormuz cuts Gulf exports, bypass pipelines partly help; Russia/Iran sell sanctioned exports at discounts. * Energy importers (EU, Japan, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Turkey, China): shocks raise inflation, weaken growth/currencies, increase subsidies; Europe gas-exposed, Asia LNG/oil-exposed. * Food-import states (Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Sahel): food shocks -> unrest, legitimacy loss, migration. * Industrial/tech hubs (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Netherlands, China): vulnerable to energy/shipping shocks, controls and tariffs. * Financial hubs/safe havens (US, UK, Switzerland, Japan): attract capital in stress; strong dollar hurts dollar debtors. * Debt-vulnerable states (Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Africa): stress + energy/food prices + rate hikes can cause currency/debt crises, defaults, IMF programs and instability. C.4 Policy levers 1. Monetary: Fed/ECB/BoE/BoJ/PBoC face stagflation: hikes lower inflation later but slow growth/hurt debtors; cuts support growth but risk inflation/currency weakness. 2. Fiscal: subsidies/caps/stimulus/defense support short-term growth/legitimacy but raise deficits/stress. 3. Tariffs: raise import prices, cut trade/growth, invite retaliation/rerouting; scale with economy/exemptions. Markets react at announcement. 4. Sanctions: cut target revenue/resources gradually; targets adapt; sanctioners pay higher energy prices; secondary sanctions pressure third countries. Relief requires verifiable diplomacy (A.9). 5. Export controls/industrial policy -> tech_competition up, supply chains fragment. 6. Energy security: reserves give temporary relief; OPEC+ matters only for exportable volumes; LNG/pipelines/coal/nuclear switching are slow. 7. Finance: IMF/World Bank, swaps, Gulf/Chinese loans can stabilize states but may require reforms/alignment and trigger protests. 8. Aid is limited and competes with defense spending (A.8). C.5 Feedback loops * Energy shock -> inflation up -> rates up -> stress up -> growth down -> unemployment/protests up -> legitimacy down -> elections/leadership change (B) -> new policy -> world stats. * War/chokepoint -> shipping, oil/gas up -> inflation up, growth down. * Stress -> capital flight -> currency/debt crisis -> instability/coup (A.5). * Food/displacement up -> humanitarian capacity down -> instability up. * Tension up -> defense spending/fiscal pressure up -> trade openness down. C.6 Thresholds/regime shifts * Oil >~$120/bbl sustained or gas several times baseline -> demand destruction/recession risk. * Financial stress >~70 -> defaults/bank failures possible; >~85 -> systemic crisis/emergency action. * Global growth <0 -> recession; trade and incumbent legitimacy fall. * Food index ~30% above baseline -> unrest in import-dependent states. * Inflation >~8% sustained -> forced rate hikes and legitimacy loss. C.7 Seasonality Winter/low EU storage raise gas prices; summer heat raises power demand; harvests move food prices; hurricanes threaten US Gulf energy. C.8 Entity-stat effects * Cost-of-living hardship lowers governing legitimacy and raises opposition influence (B). * Export windfalls raise resources only for exportable volumes. * Sanctions/capital flight reduce target resources. * Business leaders’ resources follow sector. * Economics does not change institutional_power short-term; only coups, dismissals or elections do.