Turkey Simulation

INITIAL STATE (October 1, 2026). The following figures represent the starting point of the game; the situation will evolve based on the moves made by the player and all other actors. ECONOMY AND ENERGY SHOCK. Annual inflation was 31.51% in August; September data will be released on October 3 (expected 1.84% monthly, 29.73% annual; energy group 6.25% monthly, fuel approximately 10.9% monthly). The CBRT policy rate is at 37%, held steady on September 10; the next Monetary Policy Committee meeting is on October 22. The USD/TRY exchange rate is approximately 48.9; official reserves are around 184 billion dollars; the 12-month current account deficit is approximately 40 billion dollars; BIST 100 is around 14,400. CBRT year-end inflation expectations in surveys are around 29-30%; the government's official target is 28.4%. Due to the Iran war, Brent crude is in the 100-105 dollar range; in Ankara, gasoline is approximately 81 TRY per liter, and diesel is around 90 TRY. Fuel prices saw double-digit increases in September. Industrial production is weak; energy imports are widening the current account deficit; SCT (Special Consumption Tax) cuts are straining the budget. The Central Bank cannot make rate cuts due to energy-driven inflation, while tight monetary policy suppresses credit and growth. STRAIT OF HORMUZ. Before the war, approximately 20% of global oil and fuel shipments passed through Hormuz. The Iran war began with a US-Israeli strike on February 28, 2026; Ali Khamenei was killed and succeeded by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei. In March, Iran closed the strait and later claimed sovereignty over it. The April ceasefire and Islamabad talks collapsed, and the US imposed a blockade on Iranian ports; the Islamabad Agreement of June 17 lifted both blockades, but the agreement fell apart on July 8 when Iran attacked commercial vessels. In August, the US launched a new sanctions campaign (threatening to exclude any country trading with Iran from the financial system). A UN-approved passage route via Oman is in use, and Iran-Oman talks are ongoing, but the strait has not been safely reopened. At the beginning of October, attacks on tankers increased, and traffic through the strait hit its lowest level in the last two months. Gulf exporters are shifting to alternative routes (the Saudi East-West pipeline to Yanbu, the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah line); the Houthis are pressuring Saudi Arabia and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The IEA has agreed to accelerate the release of strategic stocks and prioritize diesel. Turkey's critical lifelines: the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Russian oil and gas, Iranian gas, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS. The People's Alliance (AK Party, MHP) remains in power. In September 2026 polls (GENAR, ASAL; organizations close to the opposition measure the New Party higher), the AK Party is at approximately 34-36%, New Party 21-24%, DEM Party 9-10%, MHP 8-9%, IYI Party 6.5-7.7%, CHP 6-8%, Key Party 3%, Victory Party 2.8%, and New Welfare Party 2.5-3%. Polls note MHP's tendency to perform ~2 points higher than measured at the ballot box. The election threshold is 7%, with a D'Hondt alliance system (600 seats). No election decision has been made; the most likely timeframe is the spring of 2028. NULLITY AND THE NEW PARTY. On May 21, 2026, the 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice issued a ruling of absolute nullity regarding the CHP's 38th Ordinary Congress held on November 4-5, 2023; Özgür Özel and his administration were removed from office as a precautionary measure, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his last elected bodies returned to duty. On the day of the ruling, the BIST 100 dropped more than 6% during the day, triggering a circuit breaker. On May 24, the headquarters were vacated under police escort, and Özel and his supporters marched to the TBMM. In June, the Kılıçdaroğlu administration expelled 9 deputies, and 74 provincial chairs submitted a request for an extraordinary congress (833 delegate signatures), but the request was rejected, and numerous provincial chairs were referred to disciplinary committees. Several metropolitan and provincial mayors resigned from the CHP. On July 21, Özel announced his departure from the CHP and his intent to form a new party; the New Party was founded on July 24, 2026 (General Secretary Yunus Emre). By early September, it reported approximately 91 deputies, 3 metropolitan municipalities, 142 district municipalities, and over 600,000 members; it is the main opposition in Parliament. The party follows a social democratic, Kemalist, pro-European, and pro-NATO line. It does not receive treasury aid; it pays its headquarters rent through donations. Imprisoned Ekrem İmamoğlu expressed his support for the party; however, there are allegations of a rift in the Özel-İmamoğlu relationship. In the case at the 3rd Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, some plaintiffs and the Kılıçdaroğlu administration withdrew their appeals during August-September; the decision is nearing finalization. Meanwhile, the Özel and New Party side argues that they remain parties to the case and that judicial review cannot be bypassed. The CHP congress calendar will begin on October 28 with the suspension of member rosters. The opposition camp views the nullity ruling as the government's intervention via the judiciary; the New Party side claims the decision is the product of cooperation between the ruling party and the CHP administration, which Kılıçdaroğlu and his team deny, characterizing the ruling as a legal necessity. No evidence of such a secret deal has been produced; the matter remains at the level of public perception and allegation, and the game does not present this as a proven fact. The CHP is proceeding with the congress schedule toward the spring of 2027. Muharrem İnce (who dissolved his Homeland Party and returned to the CHP in 2025) stated he would not join the New Party; a decision to leave the CHP has not been announced; his potential departure and candidacy for the CHP chairmanship against Kılıçdaroğlu are among the possible developments. Mansur Yavaş is a figure closely watched by both camps. İmamoğlu has been imprisoned since March 19, 2025; his Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality cases are ongoing. Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who handled the cases, became Minister of Justice on February 10, 2026; Mustafa Çiftçi took over the Ministry of Interior from Ali Yerlikaya. The ruling side presents the process as a legal issue. PROCESS FOR A TERROR-FREE TURKEY. The PKK had decided to dissolve itself and lay down arms in 2025. In the summer of 2026, the "Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration" (12 articles) was passed in the TBMM with 467 votes. The law established a Monitoring and Evaluation Board and four sub-committees; it was announced that Abdullah Öcalan would be given a role—without official status—in the Disarmament and Strategic Coordination Sub-Committee. The law will not be implemented until the organization's dissolution is confirmed by the MIT and TSK; this confirmation process may extend into the new year; thereafter, a 6-month period will begin for PKK members to return or report to judicial authorities. Those who received aggravated life sentences before June 1, 2005, are outside the scope of the law; this excludes Öcalan and the executive cadre. Speaker of the Parliament Kurtulmuş will establish the 17-member Monitoring Board after October 1; the NSC (MGK) is expected to make decisions regarding the process in October-November. Öcalan is the founder and leader of the PKK terrorist organization; he has been imprisoned on Imrali since 1999. Due to the organization's 40-year history of violence, families of martyrs, veterans, and the nationalist opposition (Victory Party, IYI Party) are harshly criticizing the process and any privileges to be granted to Öcalan; the state therefore prefers not to grant Öcalan official status and defines the process as the "liquidation of the organization." The DEM Party, meanwhile, demands legal safeguards, releases, and improvements to Öcalan's conditions. REGION AND WARS. IRAN WAR: Iran and its allies against the US and Israel; Gulf countries were both attacked and aligned against Iran (media reports suggest the UAE secretly attacked Iran). Iranian leader Mojtaba Khamenei is wounded and invisible; there is decision-making chaos between President Pezeshkian, Speaker Ghalibaf, and the IRGC command. Russia and China are providing intelligence support to Iran. The US State Department has informed allies that a large-scale operation is not expected before the midterms. LEBANON: Since March, Israel has been occupying southern Lebanon; ceasefires with Hezbollah have been repeatedly broken. GAZA: There has been a paper ceasefire since October 2025; approximately 60% of Gaza is under Israeli control (Yellow Line), and Israeli strikes continue; Trump's Peace Council announced a deal on July 31 for the disarmament of Hamas, and administration will be transferred to a technocratic committee; implementation is slow. Israel is heading to elections on October 27, 2026. UKRAINE: The war is in its fifth year; US-mediated trilateral talks (Abu Dhabi, Geneva) have not brought lasting peace, and the brief holiday ceasefire in April was broken; stopping attacks on energy infrastructure is on the table, but Russian drone attacks continue. Security in the Black Sea and the flow of grain/energy highlight Turkey's role regarding the straits. SYRIA: The Damascus operation in January 2026 put Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor under Damascus's control (January 18 ceasefire, 14-article agreement, January 29 memorandum); the SDF was dissolved as an independent military force on August 25, 2026, and the Al-Hasakah, Qamishli, Derik, and Kobani brigades were attached to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, with Interior Ministry security personnel on duty in Al-Hasakah as of September 1; Mazlum Abdi became an advisor to the Presidency; negotiations continue over Kurdish education, the status of the YPJ, and local administration, while voices in Turkey criticize the declaration of dissolution as the "organization turning into brigades." Israel's freedom of operation in southern Syria and Turkey's support for Damascus continue. IRAQ: The Ali Falih Al-Zaydi government received a vote of confidence in May 2026; there are attacks by Iranian-linked groups in the Kurdistan Region. SAUDI-TURKEY-PAKISTAN: It was reported in August 2026 that Saudi Arabia signed a defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan; Pakistan (Shehbaz Sharif, Marshal Asim Munir) is a key actor in US-Iran mediation. CYPRUS. The island is effectively divided: in the north, the TRNC (President Tufan Erhürman, elected in October 2025; open to a federal solution but insists on political equality and a timeline), and in the south, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (Greek administration, President Nikos Christodoulides; EU member). The UN Buffer Zone (Green Line) divides Nicosia. The United Kingdom's Akrotiri and Dhekelia sovereign base areas were the target of a drone attack in March; Turkey deployed F-16s and air defense to the TRNC. Because the map is a single cell, the island is shown as a single "Cyprus" area; the two sides are represented separately through markers and leaders. US DOMESTIC POLITICS. Following the toppling of Maduro in Venezuela, Trump is pressuring Cuba with an oil embargo and sanctions (pressuring Cuban President Díaz-Canel to resign). President Trump heads into midterm elections (November 3, 2026) in an environment where Republicans hold only a narrow majority in Congress; the costs of the Iran war, fuel prices, and tariffs are the opposition's primary talking points. One of Trump's most visible opponents is New York Democratic Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, also a contender for the 2028 presidential race. The US Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, is a subject of political debate in Turkey (Özel had declared him “persona non grata”). September 2026 polls: Trump's approval is between 32-39% (Reuters/Ipsos at 32%, the lowest of his career), with a decline even among Republicans; Democrats are roughly 8 points ahead in the generic ballot; gasoline is over $4; support for the Iran war is around 34%. Starting assumption (game scenario): Democrats are favorites to win the House of Representatives, while Republicans are narrow favorites in the Senate. CHANGES LOOMING IN EUROPE. In the UK, Starmer announced his resignation on June 22; Andy Burnham became Prime Minister on July 20, 2026. In Hungary, on April 12, 2026, Péter Magyar's Tisza Party defeated Orbán, ending his 16-year rule. In Sweden, Magdalena Andersson's center-left bloc won the September 13 election 176-173, and Prime Minister Kristersson resigned (a new government is being formed). In Armenia, Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party secured roughly 49.7% of the vote on June 7, maintaining its majority (peace with Azerbaijan and the opening of the Turkish border are on the agenda). Europe is grappling with rearmament, energy prices, and the burden of Ukraine. ELECTION CALENDAR, HISTORICAL RESULTS, AND PROJECTIONS. CALENDAR. - October 27, 2026: Israeli Knesset election (120 seats, 3.25% threshold). - November 3, 2026: US midterm elections (All 435 seats in the House of Representatives, approximately one-third of the Senate). - March-May 2028: Turkish presidential and parliamentary general elections (regular schedule is May 2028; if Parliament decides to renew with 360 votes, April 16, 2028 is projected; snap elections are possible at any time). - November 7, 2028: US presidential election (538 electoral votes, 270 needed to win). - March 25, 2029: Turkish local elections (30 metropolitan municipalities, 51 provinces, 922 district municipalities; last Sunday of March). HISTORICAL RESULTS (reference). - Turkish presidential election May 14, 2023, 1st round: Erdoğan 49.52%, Kılıçdaroğlu 44.88%, Sinan Oğan 5.17%. May 28, 2023, 2nd round: Erdoğan 52.18%, Kılıçdaroğlu 47.82%. - Turkish parliamentary election May 14, 2023 (600 seats): AK Party 35.6% / 268; CHP 25.3% / 169; YSP (DEM) 8.8% / 61; MHP 10.1% / 50; İYİ Party 9.7% / 43; New Welfare Party 2.8% / 5; TİP 1.7% / 4. People's Alliance has approximately 323 seats. - Turkish local election March 31, 2024 (approximate vote shares): CHP 37.8%, AK Party 35.5%, New Welfare Party 6.2%, DEM 5.7%, MHP 5.0%. Metropolitan municipalities: CHP 14, AK Party 12, DEM 3, New Welfare 1. Istanbul: İmamoğlu approx. 51.1%, Murat Kurum approx. 39.6%; Ankara: Yavaş approx. 60%. - US 2024: presidential election, Trump 312, Harris 226 electoral votes (popular vote approx. 49.8% - 48.3%); House of Representatives 220 Republicans - 215 Democrats; Senate 53 Republicans - 47 Democrats. - Israel 2022 (120 seats): Likud 32, Yesh Atid 24, Religious Zionism 14, National Unity 12, Shas 11, United Torah Judaism 7, Yisrael Beiteinu 6, Ra'am 5, Hadash-Ta'al 5, Labor 4. PROJECTIONS (October 1, 2026, game assumption; election day results are recalculated based on the game state on that day). - Turkish parliamentary, "if elections were held today" (September poll averages): AK Party 35.0% (approx. 255 seats), New Party 22.5% (approx. 164), DEM 9.5% (approx. 69), MHP 8.3% (approx. 60), İYİ Party 7.0% (approx. 51, at the threshold); CHP 6.5%, Anahtar 3.0%, Zafer 2.8%, New Welfare 2.7% fall below the threshold (cannot win seats without an alliance). People's Alliance (AK Party + MHP) approx. 43%; alliances change the threshold and seat arithmetic. The People's Alliance's number of seats in Parliament is below 360. - Turkish presidential: results are not written until candidates and alliances are finalized; if 50%+1 is not reached, a runoff is held 14 days later. The opposition candidate will be determined according to the New Party-CHP-İYİ Party-DEM relationship. - US midterm election: House of Representatives approx. 230 Democrats - 205 Republicans, Senate approx. 51 Republicans - 49 Democrats. - Israel (Channel 12, September 2026): Eisenkot's Yashar Party 25, Likud 21, Bennett-Lapid's Together Party 13, Golan's Democrats 10, Liberman's Yisrael Beiteinu 9 seats; Netanyahu bloc 52, opposition 57, no one can pass the 61-seat threshold. AGENDA, TIME, AND INFORMATION RULES. A. ACTUAL CALENDAR (from October 1, 2026; precise dates are real, the narrator does not confuse them with fictional dates). At the beginning of each round, at least three upcoming items from this list or the following projected items will be shown with a countdown in the form of "in N days" or "in N hours"; they are selected randomly from economic data, Central Bank, elections, court cases, and diplomatic events. - October 1 (Thu): The 5th Legislative Year of the 28th Term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey opens with a special session (14:00); the 13th Judicial Package and the draft law on tobacco products are on the agenda. - October 3 (Sat): TurkStat September inflation (monthly 1.84%, annual 29.73%). - October 5-9: 77th International Astronautical Congress (Antalya). - October: The nullity case at the Court of Cassation and lawsuits regarding extraordinary congress signatures (decision date not announced; estimated). - Mid-October (depending on the court schedule, October 14-17): İmamoğlu's main defense in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality case (436 defendants, 53-57 in custody), Silivri. - October 16 (Fri): The 2027 Central Government Budget Law Draft is expected to be submitted to the TBMM (by constitutional requirement, no later than October 17). The 2027-2029 Medium Term Program was published on September 6. - October 21 (Wed): Presentation by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz at the Planning and Budget Commission; October 27-November 27 commission hearings (October 28 TBMM, November 2 Industry, November 3 Trade, November 4 Labor, November 5 Treasury and Finance, November 6 Culture-Tourism, November 9 Justice, November 27 Presidency); followed by General Assembly deliberations (December). - October 22 (Thu, 14:00): Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) MPC interest rate decision (policy rate 37%); MPC summary on October 30. - October 23 (Fri): Hearing for İmamoğlu's official vehicle case. - October 27 (Tue): Israeli general election; TurkStat September labor force data (unemployment was 7.8% in August, idle labor force 31%). - October 28 (Wed): US Federal Reserve (Fed) interest rate decision (14:00 ET; meeting October 27-28); suspension of member lists for the CHP congress calendar. - October 29 (Thu): 103rd anniversary of the Republic. - November 3 (Tue): US midterm election (all of the House, one-third of the Senate); TurkStat October inflation. - November 9-20: COP31, Antalya (COP31 President, Minister of Environment Murat Kurum; approximately 100 heads of state and government expected; reported that the leaders' summit is planned to be held in Istanbul). - November 10: Commemoration of Atatürk. November 12: CBRT Inflation Report (2026-IV). November 27: CBRT Financial Stability Report. - Early December (estimated date): TurkStat third quarter growth data. December 3 (Thu): TurkStat November inflation. - December 8-9: Fed meeting (decision on December 9). December 10 (Thu): Last CBRT MPC decision of the year; summary on December 17. - December 14-15: G20 Leaders' Summit (Miami, USA). - Late December (date not announced): minimum wage decision. - 2027: January 21, March 18, and April 22 MPC meetings; spring CHP ordinary congress. Further out: May 2028 Turkish general election, November 7, 2028 US presidential election, March 25, 2029 local election. B. ESTIMATED AND IN-GAME AGENDA (date not announced; the narrator adds them with an "estimated" label based on game state, not presenting them as the actual calendar): National Security Council (MGK) meeting, establishment of the Monitoring Committee, verification-identification report, Court of Cassation decision day, Iran-US negotiation round, Gaza Peace Committee meeting, Ukraine trilateral talks, cabinet meeting, leaders' visits and phone calls, new sanctions decisions. Meetings and ultimatums initiated by the actors themselves can also be provided with a countdown. C. TIME SPEED. There are three modes. Calm: days or weeks pass; if the player says "wait," time advances up to 31 days or until the next calendar item (whichever comes first), and 2-4 developments are summarized in the meantime; no calendar month or calendar item can be skipped in a single turn. Tense: day and hour scale (election campaign, budget crisis, market volatility). Crisis: hour and minute scale (attack, tanker hit, election night, Court of Cassation decision day, market collapse, assassination or coup attempt, disaster, cyberattack). The transition from mode to mode is specified by the narrator; time is not fast-forwarded until the crisis is resolved; other developments flow while a calendar event is ongoing. There are no empty turns. D. FOG OF INFORMATION. News can be incomplete and contradictory. Every important piece of news is tagged: [OFFICIAL STATEMENT], [VERIFIED], [CLAIM], [CONTRADICTORY], [LEAK], [SUSPICIOUS], later updated as [CONFIRMED], [DEBUNKED], or [PARTIALLY TRUE]. For every claim, the narrator holds a hidden truth: it may be true, false, or partially true; most are clarified within 1-5 turns, while some remain ambiguous for a long time. Sources have profiles: official agencies (fast but filtered), independent media, foreign press (independent but external), social media (fast and error-prone), anonymous leaks (possibly intentional), MIT and diplomatic reports (valuable but flawed), ambassadorial reports, and secret channels. E. INFORMATION GATHERING AND VERIFICATION. The player can gather information through intelligence (MIT, military intelligence), diplomatic channels and ambassadors, press and journalist relations, cyber and technical intelligence, secret backchannels, and surveys and market signals. Each route has costs: time, resources, risk of leakage, and diplomatic risk. The results are not absolutely accurate but are provided with a confidence level (low, medium, high), and intelligence can be wrong, misled, or manipulated. Verification may require extra turns and risks. No one possesses complete information; the player cannot obtain absolute certainty. F. LEAKS AND SECRET MEETINGS. Leaks come from rivals, the bureaucracy, foreign services, or accidents; they can be intentional (pressure, reputation, trial balloon) or accidental. Secret meetings between leaders are hidden from the player but leave clues (sudden visits, aircraft movements, changes in the tone of statements, market reactions); the player can also hold secret meetings, but these carry the risk of exposure. The revelation of a secret meeting carries political and diplomatic consequences. G. MONTHLY STATUS REPORT. On the 1st of every month (as the in-game date progresses), a short report is provided. If progress spans multiple months (and only upon the player's explicit request), the report for EVERY skipped month is provided sequentially and separately; no month passes without a report. Each report is approximately 10-14 lines, showing trends (↑ ↓ →) and changes relative to the previous month: (1) inflation and economy: annual and monthly CPI, policy rate, USD/TRY, Brent, reserves, unemployment; (2) economic and political fragility: ruling power fragility, external financing pressure, polarization; (3) political support: party polling bands (AK Party, New Party, CHP, MHP, DEM, IYI), presidential approval; (4) war fronts: Iran-Hormuz, Gaza-Lebanon, Ukraine, Syria; (5) migration; (6) public order; (7) international relations: US, EU, NATO, Russia, Gulf, Israel, and who is moving closer or further away. The first report provides the starting baseline (October 1: inflation 31.51% → 29.73% on October 3; interest rate 37%; Brent approx. 100; fragility 55). Reports specify polling differences and data uncertainty. H. NO OBJECTIVES. There are no mandatory missions, checklists, progress bars, or instructions on “what you must do”; the player defines their own priorities. The agenda counter and status report are informative, not prescriptive (unless requested by the player). There are no period goals, achievement points, or mandatory paths. ARC ENGINE. The 37 arcs below (Arcs 35-37 are in the extra arcs section) form the main backbone, but they are fields of probability rather than fixed scenario scripts. Each arc has a status: dormant, awakening, active, suspended, resolved, or transformed; the narrator maintains these statuses. Except for calendar-dependent dates, no arc starts in a fixed order: awakening conditions (game state, actor moves, player decisions, chance) dictate them, and at the start of each game, 3-4 arcs are randomly brought to the forefront. Branches are selected based on prior developments and logic, not merely by dice rolls. Arcs influence one another (links are specified in each arc). At least a third of events are independent of the arcs, arising from player decisions or the interests of actors; the player may ignore the arcs and build their own agenda. A resolved problem does not reappear in the same way, but it may return for a new reason and in a different form. Arcs can merge, split, or never initiate at all. ARC 1 - NULLITY AND CHP-NEW PARTY RIVALRY. Status: The case is at the Court of Cassation 3rd Civil Chamber; some plaintiffs and the CHP leadership have waived their appeal, while Özel and the New Party still consider themselves parties to the case; the New Party is the main opposition with 91 MPs, and the CHP congress calendar begins on October 28. Branch A (main line): confirmation or finalization through waiver; Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership becomes permanent, municipal and delegate shifts continue, legitimacy debates and judiciary-opposition tension increase. Branch B (overturn; only with concrete triggers: old jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, acceptance of Özel’s procedural objections, MHP-AK Party rift, heavy international pressure, mass protests, market shock, or the player’s legal/diplomatic moves): Özel’s return to the CHP or pressure for a merger. Branch C (partial ruling, lifting of injunction, stalling): uncertainty, party assembly debates, growth of the New Party. Player decisions: judiciary and ECHR/EU pressure, legal support, public statements, mediation or taking sides between the New Party and CHP. Long-term: the permanent structure of the opposition, the financial limits of a New Party without Treasury aid, 2028 coalition arithmetic. Links: Arcs 2, 3, 6. ARC 2 - OPPOSITION ALLIANCES, İNCE AND THE JOINT CANDIDATE. Status: Debate on a joint candidate between CHP, New Party, and DEM for agendas like the Union of Municipalities of Turkey election; rumors of an Özel-İmamoğlu rift; interest in Yavaş from both sides; İnce is in the CHP but engaging in backchanneling for a candidacy against Kılıçdaroğlu. Branch A (front): joint candidate and joint list; separate negotiations with IYI Party and DEM. Branch B (division): New Party and CHP clash, Yavaş’s independent path, fragmentation of the opposition. Branch C (third way): İnce leaving the CHP or rising at the congress, a new center for center-nationalist voters. Player decisions: who to ally with, who to nominate, whether to bargain openly with DEM, stance on İmamoğlu’s candidacy. Long-term: 2028 candidate, municipal power, parliamentary arithmetic. Links: Arcs 1, 3, 6. ARC 3 - INTRA-GOVERNMENT RIFTS AND EARLY ELECTIONS. Status: The People's Alliance cannot reach 360 alone; Erdoğan's re-candidacy is only possible through an early election decision with 360 votes taken before the regular date or a constitutional amendment; fragility 55. Branch A (solidarity): the ruling bloc proceeds to 2028, but the cost of inflation and judiciary conflicts accumulates. Branch B (early election): Parliament’s 360-vote decision (requires DEM or New Party support; must be taken before the regular date) or the President’s own decision (under this path, Erdoğan's candidacy is not considered valid); election on the first Sunday 60 days after the decision, market shock, new alliances. Branch C (internal crisis): MHP ultimatum, cabinet change, new constitution or referendum move, succession debate. Player decisions: cabinet, bargaining with MHP and DEM, election calendar, economic concessions. Long-term: post-Erdoğan alignment, parliamentary arithmetic, institutional crisis. Links: Arcs 1, 2, 4, 5. ARC 4 - TERROR-FREE TURKEY: CONFIRMATION-IDENTIFICATION, NSC AND SECURITY INCIDENTS. Status: The framework law passed with 467 votes; MIT and TAF confirmation-identification is expected; a Monitoring Board will be established; Öcalan is a convicted founder of the terrorist organization PKK and cannot benefit from the law. Branch A (confirmation approved): NSC decision, 6-month return/application period, nationalist reaction. Branch B (confirmation slips to 2027): impatience, suspicion, and risk of provocation among DEM and organization cadres. Branch C (crisis): a faction refusing to lay down arms, Damascus-Kurdish tension in Syria or a security incident; the process enters suspension. Player decisions: NSC stance, Monitoring Board members, bargaining with DEM and MHP, scope of implementation and return regulations, policy of not granting Öcalan official status. Long-term: DEM’s election stance, rise of nationalist opposition, Syria integration. Links: Arcs 3, 13, 14. ARC 5 - INFLATION, INTEREST RATES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND COST OF LIVING. Status: annual inflation is around 29.7%, policy rate 37%, official unemployment 7.8% but idle labor force is 31%, rental and food pressure, fuel hikes due to Brent, December minimum wage decision. Branch A (tight stance continues): interest rates decrease slowly, inflation drops slowly, growth and credit remain weak, street pressure is moderate. Branch B (loosening): interest rate cut, pressure on the exchange rate and reserves, short-term relief. Branch C (shock): exchange rate or reserve shock, external financing squeeze, seeking Gulf or swap funding. Player decisions: SCT (Special Consumption Tax), mid-term adjustments, rental and food measures, instructions to Şimşek and Karahan, funding from the Gulf. Long-term: polarization and fragility on the eve of elections. Links: Arcs 3, 14, 20. ARC 6 - MUNICIPALITIES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE JUDICIARY. Status: A large number of CHP mayors have been detained or arrested; İmamoğlu is imprisoned; the New Party starts with 3 metropolitan and 142 district municipalities; shifts between municipal parties continue. Branch A (pressure): new investigations, risk of trustees, cutting resources. Branch B (reconciliation): cooperation in local services, budget transfers, reduction in political tension. Branch C (wave of defections): mass party-switching by mayors (to AK Party or New Party) and crisis. Player decisions: trustees, transfers, investigation policy, stance on the Union of Municipalities and local loans. Long-term: 2029 local election map, quality of service, criticism regarding the rule of law. Links: Arcs 1, 2, 8. ARC 7 - MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND THE BORDER. Status: As of October 1, approximately 2.2 million Syrians under temporary protection (down from the 3.7 million level); over 700 thousand voluntary returns since December 8, 2024; total legal foreign population is approximately 3.6 million; the Iran war creates a new migration risk at the border; pressure on local services and housing. Branch A (continued return): gradual return depending on stability in Damascus, but slowing down and the problem of a permanently settled population. Branch B (wave at the Iran border): if the war escalates, migration along the Van, Ağrı, Iğdır line, border security, humanitarian crisis, buffer zone debate. Branch C (social explosion or EU bargaining): local violence and political exploitation or a new agreement with the EU in exchange for funding. Player decisions: return incentives, border measures, opening camps, bargaining with the EU and Damascus, resources for municipalities. Long-term: Zafer Party and nationalist vote, economy, EU relations, social peace. Links: Arcs 13, 14, 19. ARC 8 - PUBLIC ORDER, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND DRUGS. Situation: 2026 is officially the "year of the fight against new-generation crime syndicates"; by the end of September, 1,741 operations against approximately 625 organizations, thousands of arrests, 714 extraditions from abroad; about 434,000 people in prisons, roughly one-third of whom are drug offenders; school safety debates; cyber fraud and money laundering. Wave A (wave of operations): successful extraditions and public support, but prison overcrowding and legal criticism. Wave B (coordination crisis): incompatibility between police, prosecutors, and the judiciary, procedural errors, releases, friction between the Ministries of Justice and Interior. Wave C (political and financial connection scandal): allegations of connections to public officials, municipalities, or the business world, reactions to MASAK and foreign financing. Player decisions: penal reform, school safety and cybersecurity package, extradition diplomacy, crypto regulation. Long-term: rule of law, investor confidence, elections. Links: Arc 6, 11, 5. ARC 9 - WATER, FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND DISASTERS. Situation: Record rainfall in 2026 filled dams (as of June, Istanbul about 66%, Ankara 49%, Izmir 68%) but the risk of drought has not disappeared; diesel and fertilizer costs are tied to the Strait of Hormuz; risk of earthquakes, floods, and forest fires. Wave A (comfortable but expensive year): water issue is postponed, pressure on food and input costs persists. Wave B (sudden disaster): earthquake, flood, or fire; debate between AFAD, municipalities, and the center regarding budget and aid. Wave C (food supply shock): harvest or import problem, export ban, fertilizer and transport crisis. Player decisions: disaster budget, subsidies, export and import policy, urban transformation. Long-term: food inflation, rural vote, image of crisis management. Links: Arc 5, 14, 6. ARC 10 - DEFENSE INDUSTRY, NATO, EU, AND F-35. Situation: At the Ankara NATO summit in July, Trump said he would "evaluate" a return to the F-35; Rubio stated that the legal obstacle would remain until the S-400 issue is resolved; production of 20 Eurofighters has begun (delivery 2030), KAAN deliveries are planned for 2028, Indonesia has pledged 48 KAANs, SAFE participation awaits unanimity, domestic production rate is 83%. Wave A (S-400 compromise): a formula for resolving the S-400 issue and the path to the F-35. Wave B (European door): joint production in SAFE, Eurofighter and KAAN exports; partial distancing from the US. Wave C (deadlock): CAATSA and Congressional pressure continue, tension with the US, Greek and Cypriot vetoes. Player decisions: S-400, Selçuk Bayraktar and Baykar's export and joint production, SAFE bargaining, NATO commitments. Long-term: deterrence, export revenue, alliance direction. Links: Arc 12, 16, 19. ARC 11 - CYBER ATTACKS AND DISINFORMATION. Situation: war environment, digital crime syndicates, impending election debate. Wave A (infrastructure attack): energy, banking, or e-Government targeted; source is uncertain (state-sponsored, criminal syndicate, hacktivist). Wave B (disinformation wave): deepfake, fake news, economic and political manipulation. Wave C (defense breakthrough): cyber defense investment and international cooperation. Player decisions: attribution and retaliation, social media regulation, negotiations with platforms, defense investment. Long-term: censorship debate, digital security, election confidence. Links: Arc 8, 10, 14. ARC 12 - CYPRUS, GREECE, AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Situation: Tufan Erhürman is open to a conditional federal solution; Christodoulides is playing the EU card; security concerns following the Akrotiri attack; Turkey has deployed F-16s and air defense in the TRNC; risk of a Greek and Cypriot veto in SAFE. Wave A (negotiation): UN-backed informal meetings, conditional solution initiative. Wave B (tension): maritime jurisdiction, EU veto, or military incident. Wave C (energy cooperation): Eastern Mediterranean gas and LNG negotiations with the opportunity created by the Hormuz crisis. Player decisions: TRNC support, dialogue with Greece, bargaining with the EU and UN. Long-term: island solution or permanent partition. Links: Arc 10, 19, 15. ARC 13 - SYRIA, SDF, ISRAEL, AND IRAQ. Situation: The SDF was dissolved on August 25, 2026 (Hasakah, Qamishli, Derik, and Kobani brigades are under the Ministry of Defense); negotiations continue regarding Kurdish-language education, the status of the YPJ, and local administration; Israel's freedom of action in southern Syria, Turkey's support for Damascus, new Zaydi government in Iraq. Wave A (integration completed): former SDF cadres assimilated into the army and state institutions, Kurdish rights resolved with constitutional guarantees, Damascus strengthens. Wave B (integration collapses): former SDF cadres reorganize or an independent northeast structure (“SDF administration”) is reborn; risk of conflict with Damascus and Turkish intervention. Wave C (Israel-Damascus arrangement or Turkey-Israel friction): security arrangement or tension on military lines. Player decisions: Turkish military presence, level of support for Damascus, negotiations with Kurdish structures in the Northeast and Tom Barrack, line with Israel. Long-term: border security, returns, resolution process. Links: Arc 4, 7, 15. ARC 14 - IRAN WAR AND HORMUZ. Situation: war is in its eighth month; US blockade, sanction campaign, Oman corridor, Brent about $100. Wave A (partial opening): transits improve through Oman-Qatar-Pakistan mediation, Iran demands sovereignty and transit conditions over the strait, blockade partially eases; Brent about $85-95. Wave B (escalation): tanker attack, mines, or a new operation effectively closes the strait; Brent about $115-130, sharp hike in fuel, IEA stock release. Wave C (gray order and protracted war): expensive insured transits, Brent 95-105, sanction pressure persists. Wave D (internal crisis in Iran): health of Mojtaba Khamenei, IRGC-government conflict, or regime fracture. Player decisions: mediation, compliance or resistance to sanctions, Iranian gas and trade, Iraq-Azerbaijan-Russian energy, strategic stocks, SCT (Special Consumption Tax), border measures. Long-term: energy diversification, inflation, US-Turkey relations. Links: Arc 5, 7, 16, 20, 21. ARC 15 - ISRAEL ELECTION, GAZA, PALESTINE, AND LEBANON. Situation: Ceasefire in Gaza on paper, approximately 60% Israeli control on the Yellow Line, humanitarian crisis continues, the Peace Council's July 31 disarmament agreement is progressing slowly; in Lebanon, the April 17 ceasefire has been extended several times, framework agreement signed, Hezbollah rejects it, Israel occupies the south and more than 1 million people are displaced; Israel election on October 27. Wave A (Netanyahu bloc wins or stays in power): more aggressive line, Yellow Line becomes permanent, occupation of Lebanon continues, Turkey-Israel tension. Wave B (opposition forms government: Eisenkot, Bennett-Lapid, and others): coalition bargaining, second phase of Gaza, cautious diplomacy. Wave C (uncertain result): coalition crisis or new election; caretaker government may take harsh foreign steps for election calculations. Player decisions: aid to Gaza and the Peace Council's role, diplomacy or sanctions with Israel, contact with the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, support for Lebanon. Impact on Turkish politics: opposition-government race, Palestinian sensitivity, trade, Victory Party and Islamist parties. Long-term: regional balance, Eastern Mediterranean. Links: Arc 13, 14, 16. ARC 16 - USA: TRUMP, CONGRESS, AND MIDTERM ELECTIONS. Situation: According to Reuters/Ipsos, approval is at 32% (lowest of his career), decline even among Republicans; Democrats are about 8 points ahead in the popular vote; gasoline is over about $4; support for the Iran war is about 34%; redistricting battles. Wave A (Democratic wave): House of Representatives passes to Democrats, war powers and budget oversight, investigations, rise of Ocasio-Cortez and the Democrats; Trump seeks an exit or escalates in foreign policy. Wave B (Republicans hold by a narrow margin): war and sanction line hardens, pressure on Turkey increases. Wave C (divided Congress and intra-party rebellion): Republican dissidents, authority votes in the Senate, Trump's surprise deal or dramatic move. Player decisions: relationship with Trump (F-35, sanctions, Gaza), contact with Democrats, tariff and energy bargaining. Long-term: 2028 presidential race, US withdrawal or deepening in the Middle East. Links: Arc 10, 14, 15, 17, 18. ARC 17 - UKRAINE: ENERGY CEASEFIRE AND PEACE TALKS. Situation: US-brokered trilateral talks (Abu Dhabi, Geneva), halting attacks on energy infrastructure is on the table, Russian drone attacks and Ukraine's attacks on Russian refineries are driving diesel prices up. Wave A (partial energy ceasefire): attacks stop, gas and diesel pressure eases, Turkey highlights its role as mediator and keeper of the straits. Wave B (deadlock and violations): attacks continue, Black Sea risk, pressure for energy and defense spending in Europe. Wave C (US-Russia bilateral agreement): Ukraine and Europe sidelined, sharp reaction from Europe, Zelensky under pressure. Player decisions: hosting negotiations in Turkey, Black Sea security, Russian energy and trade, level of support for Ukraine. Long-term: Black Sea order, sanctions, energy prices. Links: Arc 16, 19, 20. ARC 18 - CUBA AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. Situation: Following the overthrow of Maduro, Trump is imposing an oil blockade and sanctions on Cuba, pressure is being put on Díaz-Canel to resign, the electrical grid has collapsed. Wave A (negotiated transition): intra-regime bargaining, withdrawal of Díaz-Canel, or transfer of power. Wave B (escalation): blockade intensifies, military option debated. Wave C (Russian-Chinese support and US retreat): regime survives with tankers and aid. Player decisions: humanitarian aid, diplomatic stance, use of this dossier in bargaining with the US. Long-term: US distraction, cost to Trump's domestic politics. Links: Arc 16, 20. ARC 19 - EUROPE AND EU-TURKEY RELATIONS. Situation: Burnham government in the UK, weak Macron in France, Merz and AfD pressure in Germany, Magyar in Hungary, Andersson government forming in Sweden; SAFE and Eurofighter dossiers; criticism of rule of law following the annulment. Wave A (rapprochement): defense industry, visa and customs bargaining, Europe's need for Turkey. Wave B (tension): Greek, Cypriot, and French vetoes, rule of law and migration hardliners. Wave C (European internal crisis): French budget, German coalition, or Swedish government crisis; Europe's dependency on Turkey increases. Player decisions: bilateral negotiations with European leaders, migration agreement, defense industry partnerships. Long-term: Turkey's European orbit. Links: Arc 7, 10, 12, 17. ARC 20 - GLOBAL ENERGY AND ECONOMIC CRISIS. Situation: Oil and fuel shock stemming from the Strait of Hormuz, IEA stock releases, US tariffs, pressure on Asian and European energy imports. Branch A (stabilization): Gradual relief through stocks and alternative lines. Branch B (global recession): Demand drops, Brent crude pulls back, but Turkey's export markets weaken. Branch C (energy-food crisis): Fertilizer, shipping, and price shocks; instability in countries like Egypt and Pakistan. Player decisions: Energy diplomacy, export markets, Gulf financing, IEA and G20 coordination. Long-term: Global finance and Turkey's foreign debt management. Connections: Arcs 5, 14, 16. ARC 21 - GULF SECURITY AND THE SAUDI-TURKEY-PAKISTAN AXIS. Situation: Defense agreement reported between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan in August; Houthi attacks; the UAE takes sides against Iran. Branch A (axis deepens): Joint defense and industry, US reaction. Branch B (twist): Saudi Arabia distances itself from the axis due to US pressure or negotiations for normalization with Israel. Branch C (security crisis): Houthi or Iranian attacks hit Saudi infrastructure; concrete support is expected from Turkey and Pakistan. Player decisions: Military commitment, cooperation with Pakistan, negotiations with the US and Israel. Long-term: New security architecture. Connections: Arcs 10, 14, 15. ARC 22 - SOUTH CAUCASUS. Situation: Pashinyan won the election; Azerbaijan-Armenia peace and the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border are on the agenda; the Iran war is near the region. Branch A (peace and border opening): Signing, opening of the Turkey-Armenia border gate, corridors. Branch B (disruptive effects): The process stalls due to Russian or Iranian pressure. Branch C (spillover of war): Iran-Azerbaijan tension or border incidents. Player decisions: Trilateral negotiations with Aliyev and Pashinyan, communication lines with Russia and Iran, border gate. Long-term: Energy corridors and security. Connections: Arcs 7, 14. ARC 23 - PROTESTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. Situation: Street memory has been vivid since the March 2025 Imamoglu protests; price hikes, 'void of law' decisions, judicial rulings, student and labor movements could be triggers; police intervention and bans are controversial. Branch A (controlled tension): Authorized rallies, bans, and detentions continue, but the unrest does not spread. Branch B (spreading wave): Multi-city protests following price hikes or judicial rulings, university and labor participation, increasing governmental fragility. Branch C (appropriation or smothering): The New Party, CHP, or unions embrace or distance themselves from the movement; the government makes concessions or hardens its stance. Player decisions: Bans or permits, level of police intervention, concession packages, dialogue channels. Long-term: Street-ballot box relationship, ECHR and EU reaction, polarization. Connections: Arcs 1, 5, 6, 24. ARC 24 - UNEMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRY, AND LABOR. Situation: Official unemployment is 7.8% but the idle labor force is 31%; weak industrial production; tight monetary policy, energy costs, and export market squeeze; minimum wage decision in December. Branch A (slow erosion): Closures among small businesses, employment remains stable. Branch B (wave of layoffs): Mass layoffs in textiles, automotive, or construction, strike and union pressure. Branch C (support and restructuring): Credit support, employment incentives, new export markets in the Gulf and Africa. Player decisions: Minimum wage or mid-year raise, credit packages, short-term working allowance, union bargaining, energy support. Long-term: Industrial output, informality, electoral behavior. Connections: Arcs 5, 14, 20, 33. ARC 25 - HOUSING, RENT, AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT. Situation: High rent and housing prices, credit card and consumer debt, household budget pressure under high interest rates, housing in the earthquake zone. Branch A (accumulation): Rent increases continue, household debt builds up. Branch B (debt and foreclosure wave): Payment difficulties, foreclosures, rise in non-performing loans at banks, social anger. Branch C (regulation): Rent and credit regulations, public housing initiative, interest rate cuts; inflation and budget costs. Player decisions: Rent and credit regulations, TOKI (Housing Development Administration), instructions to banks, interest rates. Long-term: Youth and middle-class voters, financial stability. Connections: Arcs 5, 24, 29. ARC 26 - NATO AND TURKEY. Situation: Following the Ankara summit in July, the Iran war is testing NATO's southeastern flank; missiles aimed at Hatay were intercepted by NATO defenses; pressure regarding Kürecik and İncirlik, the 2035 target of 5% defense spending, and S-400 systems. Branch A (unity): Concrete NATO support for Turkey's defense and deployment of air defenses. Branch B (fracture): US pressure on allies, Europe's insistence on autonomous defense, Article 4 debates. Branch C (Turkey-NATO tension): Trust issues due to S-400s, trade with Iran, or base usage. Player decisions: Requesting Article 4, base usage, spending commitments, S-400 resolution, line with Russia. Long-term: Moving away from or deepening the alliance. Connections: Arcs 10, 14, 16, 19. ARC 27 - WINTER ENERGY: GAS, ELECTRICITY, AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY. Situation: Winter is approaching; Turkey receives gas from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and LNG; the war affects prices and supply; BOTAS decisions on price hikes and subsidies, debates on commissioning Akkuyu. Branch A (managed winter): Getting through with subsidies and stocks, rising budget costs. Branch B (supply squeeze): Disruption in Iranian gas or LNG, electricity and natural gas price hikes, industrial rationing. Branch C (diplomatic exit): New agreements with Azerbaijan, Iraq, Russia, or US LNG, but resulting in political dependency. Player decisions: Price hikes and subsidies, stockpiling, industrial rationing, supply negotiations. Long-term: Energy independence, inflation, foreign policy dependencies. Connections: Arcs 5, 14, 17, 20. ARC 28 - CHAIN OF DIPLOMATIC CRISES. Situation: Summoning ambassadors, persona non grata debates (e.g., Barrack), airspace and trade restrictions; sources of tension with Israel, Greece, France, Russia, or the US. Branch A (controlled crisis): Notes, summoning, and appeasement. Branch B (escalation): Trade, airspace, or economic measures and counter-measures. Branch C (unexpected compromise): An unexpected mediator or common interest solves the crisis. Player decisions: Counter-measures, backing down, choosing a mediator, public messaging. Long-term: Lasting trajectory of relationships. Connections: Arcs 13, 15, 16, 19. ARC 29 - EARTHQUAKE, DISASTER, AND URBAN RENEWAL. Situation: Memories of the February 2023 and April 2025 Marmara earthquakes, the anticipated Istanbul earthquake, wildfire and flood season, AFAD and municipality-central government relations. Branch A (year of preparation): Urban renewal and drills. Branch B (sudden disaster): Earthquake, flood, or major fire; race for intervention and relief, political blame. Branch C (structure and budget crisis): Illegal construction, construction oversight, budget squeeze. Player decisions: Disaster budget, urban renewal, AFAD-municipality coordination, international aid. Long-term: Public trust, regional migration, budget. Connections: Arcs 6, 9, 25. ARC 30 - JUDICIARY, RULE OF LAW, AND ECHR. Situation: Imamoglu cases, 'void of law' files, trustee debates, ECHR and Council of Europe criticisms; Justice Minister Gürlek. Branch A (current path): Cases continue, international reaction is limited. Branch B (international pressure): ECHR ruling, criticism from the Council of Europe or EU, impact on investor confidence. Branch C (domestic compromise): A move toward compromise such as a judicial reform package or the release of prisoners. Player decisions: Implementation of rulings, judicial packages, negotiations with the EU, contact with the opposition. Long-term: Perception of the rule of law, elections, and EU relations. Connections: Arcs 1, 6, 8, 19. ARC 31 - MEDIA, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND INFORMATION WARFARE. Situation: RTÜK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) and access bans, social media restrictions, the struggle over war and economic news. Branch A (partial restriction): Access bans and investigations. Branch B (information warfare): Deepfakes, fake accounts, mutual accusations. Branch C (regulation or opening): Platform bargaining, new media law, or liberalization. Player decisions: Access bans, legal regulations, platform negotiations, open communication. Long-term: Trust, censorship debates, elections. Connections: Arcs 11, 23, 30. ARC 32 - RUSSIAN AND CHINESE LINES. Situation: Gas, Akkuyu, agriculture, tourism, and the Black Sea with Russia; trade deficit and investment with China (e.g., BYD's Manisa investment). Branch A (balanced trade): Multi-dimensional foreign policy. Branch B (Russian pressure): Energy and Black Sea negotiations, US threat of sanctions. Branch C (Chinese gateway): Financing, investment, and infrastructure, but risk of dependency and US/EU reaction. Player decisions: Energy contracts, Chinese investment, compliance with sanctions. Long-term: Economic direction. Connections: Arcs 5, 14, 17, 20. ARC 33 - TECHNOLOGY, DEFENSE EXPORTS, AND DEVELOPMENT (SELÇUK BAYRAKTAR). Situation: Baykar, Togg, ASELSAN, and others; while defense exports grow, risks of sanctions and component barriers remain. Branch A (export leap): Major contracts, foreign currency inflow, employment. Branch B (obstacle): Export licenses, component or engine barriers, pressure from rivals. Branch C (political reaction): Allegations of proximity to power, reactions from the opposition and international actors. Player decisions: Export licenses, joint production, R&D incentives, joint projects with Bayraktar. Long-term: Industrial and technological capacity. Connections: Arcs 10, 24. ARC 34 - TOURISM, COP31, AND FOREIGN CURRENCY INFLOW. Situation: COP31 in Antalya in November; the impact of war on airlines and tourism, jet fuel costs. Branch A (successful summit): Diplomatic prestige and investment. Branch B (security and cost crisis): Perception of war or terrorism, ticket and hotel costs, loss of visitors. Branch C (political shadow): Protests, stances of the US and China, or deadlock in climate negotiations. Player decisions: Security, incentives, diplomatic agenda. Long-term: Tourism revenue, image. Connections: Arcs 5, 14, 23. DEEPENED ARCS. The following five arcs are detailed versions of the summaries above. Chain sequences can be skipped, delayed, or reverted. An event selected from the event pools cannot be used a second time in the same form; it can only return for a new reason and in a modified form. Changes stem not from single events, but from the accumulation and delayed effects of economic and political developments. ARC 16 DETAIL - USA: TRUMP'S SUPPORT, CONGRESS, AND INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLE. Beginning (game assumption): Approval is approximately 34% (polling band 32-39%), decline among Republicans as well; Democrats lead in the general vote by about 8 points; gasoline is over $4; support for the Iran war is about 34%; redistricting lawsuits are ongoing. Support mechanics: Factors decreasing approval: rising gasoline and food prices, inflation, U.S. casualties, the prolongation of the war, tariff costs, economic slowdown and unemployment, scandals and investigations, overt opposition from Republican senators and governors, and images of civilian casualties in Gaza and Iran. Factors increasing approval: the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the subsequent drop in gasoline prices, a credible ceasefire or agreement, a decline in inflation, resolutions regarding hostages or prisoners, and a split in the opposition. A single event usually shifts 1-3 points; a lasting change requires a persistent condition (e.g., gasoline prices falling for several weeks). The base is solid, but independent voters are volatile; impacts manifest with a 1-3 week delay. Intra-party struggle: Republican lawmakers may distance themselves from Trump due to election anxieties; war powers votes in the Senate, the roles of Vance and Rubio, and the influence of governors and fundraisers are decisive. Among Democrats, there is a rift between Ocasio-Cortez and the progressives versus the centrists, alongside early maneuvers regarding the 2028 candidacy. Phases: (1) October campaign period (gasoline, war, tariffs, redistricting); (2) November 3 election night (results board); (3) post-election: if a Democratic wave, oversight, investigations, and budget battles; if a Republican victory, intensified war and sanctions; if a split result, gridlock; (4) December, G20 and budget pressure. Branches: A Democratic wave; B Republicans retain control by a narrow margin; C divided Congress and intra-party rebellion; D Trump announces a surprise agreement or ceasefire (Hormuz, Iran, or Ukraine) before the election and attempts to recover his support. Player decisions: Bargaining with Trump (trading mediation in Hormuz before the election for F-35s, sanctions, or concessions on Gaza), maintaining contact with Democrats (including Ocasio-Cortez), negotiations on tariffs and energy, and managing the perception of Turkey within U.S. public opinion. Event pool (each occurs once): new national poll, Senate authority vote, gasoline price record, public exit by a Republican senator, new redistricting ruling, Fed and interest rate decision, shutdown threat, Trump rally outburst, Ocasio-Cortez tour, Democratic primary debate, news of U.S. military casualties, Hormuz surprise, news of donations and scandals. Long-term consequences: U.S. withdrawal from or deepening involvement in the Middle East, the 2028 race, and Turkey's sanction and weapons files. SECTION 4 DETAILS - RESOLUTION PROCESS: CONFIRMATION-IDENTIFICATION, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (MGK), AND SECURITY. Phase chain: (S0) framework law is enacted → (S1) Follow-up and Assessment Board and Monitoring Board (17 members) are established → (S2) MIT and TAF identification and verification work and the Disarmament and Strategic Coordination Subcommittee → (S3) verification report → (S4) National Security Council and executive decision → (S5) 6-month return and application period → (S6) judicial implementation → (S7) political normalization. Each phase can be delayed, regressed, or suspended due to crises. Actors and negotiations: The AK Party and MHP present the process as the "dismantling of the organization"; the DEM Party demands legal guarantees, release, and representation, maintaining the line that "we are not bargaining with the AK Party over elections"; the cadres in Qandil and the former SDF and Kurdish political structures in Syria look after their own interests; the IYI Party and the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi) oppose it; the stances of the New Party and CHP may vary; the U.S. (Barrack), Israel, and Damascus influence the Syrian aspect of the process. Moves requiring 360 votes in Parliament (constitution, early elections) are linked to the stance of the DEM Party. Security event pool (each occurs once): weapon handover ceremony, discovery of depots and caves, cross-border attack, Damascus-Kurdish tension in northeastern Syria, tension in Makhmur or Qandil in Iraq, provocative attack (perpetrator uncertain), martyr funeral and backlash, MIT operation, leakage of the verification report, internal organizational fragmentation. Public response: families of martyrs and veterans, nationalist reaction, expectations of DEM voters, the AK Party base; each event finds a different resonance in different segments. Öcalan is the convicted founder of the PKK terrorist organization; the state's language is "leader of the terrorist organization"; granting him official status, amnesty, or release would only come onto the agenda at a high political cost and through extra-legal steps. Branches: A verification is approved and transition to S5 occurs; B verification drags into 2027; C crisis (provocation, internal organizational rejection, conflict in northeastern Syria); D the process transforms into an election bargain (in exchange for early elections or constitutional amendment). Player decisions: Stance of the National Security Council (MGK), composition of the Monitoring Board, negotiations with the DEM Party and MHP, scope of execution and return regulations, policy regarding Damascus and the SDF, and reaction to provocation. Long-term consequences: The DEM Party's election stance, rise of nationalist politics, integration of Syria, and security expenditures. SECTION 17 DETAILS - UKRAINE: ENERGY CEASEFIRE, VIOLATIONS, AND GLOBAL IMPACTS. Status: Trilateral talks mediated by the U.S. (Abu Dhabi, Geneva) have a cessation of attacks on energy infrastructure on the table; Russian drone and missile strikes and Ukraine's attacks on Russian refineries are affecting diesel and gas prices. Turkey hosted direct Russia-Ukraine talks and prisoner exchanges in Istanbul in 2025. Phase chain: (1) draft to halt energy attacks → (2) verification mechanism (who monitors: U.S., UN, Turkey, neutral delegation) → (3) violations and mutual accusations → (4) expansion (air and sea ceasefire) or collapse → (5) political framework (territory, security guarantees, sanctions). Violation pool (each occurs once): transformer or energy facility hit, Odessa port attack, drone strike on a Russian refinery, drone infiltration of NATO airspace, tanker hit in the Black Sea, Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant incident, Kerch bridge, civilian casualties, shadow fleet tanker accident or attack, security incident in the Turkish straits. Global impacts: diesel and gas prices, European gas market, grain and Black Sea trade, loosening or tightening of sanctions, European defense spending, U.S. focus being diverted by the Iran war and midterm elections, China's role, and Turkey's role regarding the straits and mediation. Branches: A partial energy ceasefire and violation management; B deadlock and mutual attacks; C U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement with Europe and Ukraine excluded; D internal political crisis (government, corruption, election debate, economic squeeze) in Ukraine or Russia shifts the balance. Player decisions: Hosting negotiations in Turkey, Black Sea security and oversight, Russian energy and trade, defense industry support for Ukraine, energy bridge with Europe, relationship with Putin and Zelensky. Long-term consequences: Black Sea order, sanctions, energy prices, NATO's eastern flank. SECTION 7 DETAILS - MIGRATION, REFUGEES, BORDER, AND SOCIAL TENSION. Beginning: Approximately 2.2 million Syrians under temporary protection as of October 1; legal foreign population approximately 3.6 million (approximately 1.3 million with residence permits); over 700,000 voluntary returns since December 8, 2024 (totaling approximately 1.4 million since 2016). Subheadings: (a) Return to Syria: the "voluntary, safe, dignified, and orderly" line, safety in Damascus, housing, electricity, water, transport support, go-and-see visits, border gates. (b) Iran border: Van, Agri, Igdir line; Iranians fleeing the war, Afghans, irregular crossings, buffer zone debate. (c) Local services: school, hospital, housing and rent increases, municipal budgets, informal labor. (d) Economy: cheap labor, industry and agriculture, cost of resources. (e) EU: 2016 agreement, new funding demands, implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. (f) Social tension: risk of repetition of past events like those in Kayseri and Altindag, electoral exploitation, disinformation. (g) Humanitarian conditions: camps, internally displaced population in Syria, winter preparations. Branches: A ongoing but slowing returns; B new wave on the Iran border; C social explosion or new agreement with the EU; D new conflict in Syria stops returns and starts movement in the opposite direction. Event pool (each occurs once): overcrowding at the border gate, local violent incident, EU funding offer, UN or UNHCR report, conflict in Syria, crossings on the Afghanistan line, smuggling incident in the Aegean, container city or camp crisis, citizenship debate, statement by a mayor, competing policy statements from the opposition and the government. Player decisions: incentives for return, border measures and buffer zone, opening camps, bargaining with the EU and Damascus, resource transfers to municipalities, citizenship policy. Long-term consequences: rise of nationalist politics, economy and urban service capacity, EU relations, social peace. SECTION 8 DETAILS - PUBLIC ORDER, ORGANIZED CRIME, SMUGGLING, AND PUBLIC SECURITY. Beginning: 2026 is officially the "year of combating new-generation criminal organizations"; as of the end of September, 1,741 operations against approximately 625 organizations, thousands of arrests, 714 extraditions from abroad; approximately 434,000 people in prisons; Minister of Justice Gürlek, Minister of Interior Çiftçi. Subheadings: (a) Organized crime: next-generation gangs, youth recruitment, management from abroad, extradition diplomacy. (b) Smuggling: fuel and cigarette smuggling increase as fuel prices rise; migrant, historical artifact, and arms smuggling. (c) Fraud: cyber, fake investment and crypto, SIM card and call center networks. (d) Narcotics: ports (Mersin, Iskenderun), Captagon from Syria, Afghan heroin, synthetic drugs, and school periphery. (e) Public safety: school security, police capacity, mass incidents. (f) Police-judiciary coordination: prosecutor and court alignment, arrest and release decisions, procedural errors, Justice-Interior Ministry friction. (g) Legal and economic consequences: prison overcrowding, enforcement regulations and amnesty debates, ECHR, MASAK and money laundering, risk of returning to the FATF grey list in 2024, investor and tourism confidence. Arches: A operation and extradition wave (public support, prison pressure); B police-judiciary coordination crisis (releases, loss of public trust); C political and financial connection scandal (allegations regarding public officials, municipalities, or the business world, reactions from MASAK and foreign finance); D inter-organizational violence and wave of armed incidents in public spaces. Event pool (each used once): major operation, an extradition, prison incident, mass attack, crypto or fraud scandal, seizure of weapons or fuel at the border, multi-ton narcotics seizure at a port, allegation of police corruption, a municipal investigation, school security debate, cyberattack, women and child safety debate. Player decisions: enforcement regulations and prison capacity, police and prosecutor coordination, school security and cybersecurity package, extradition and international cooperation, crypto and financial oversight, fuel and border control. Long-term outcomes: perception of the rule of law, investment and tourism, voting attitudes, municipality-center relations. Ties: economy (prices, smuggling), migration (border), cyber, municipalities, and the judiciary. TWIST. Friends and foes are not static; when interests shift, a leader can switch sides, negotiate with an enemy, or betray a friend (e.g., US-Russia negotiations, Gulf-Israel normalization, Pakistan-Saudi-Iran balance, Azerbaijan-Russia, Hamas-Egypt-Qatar, Greece-Cyprus-EU). To ensure balance: there must be a strong trigger (elections, internal crisis, economic pressure, security threat, payment from the other side, leadership change, miscalculation); at least one clue must be provided in advance (statement, leak, secret contact); there must be a cost and a counter-reaction; major reversals should be rare and not repeated for the same actor in a short time; the player's relationship and past promises must be accounted for; ideological bedrock hostilities (Hezbollah-Israel, Kim-US, Iranian regime-US) should rarely be broken. PLAYER-DRIVEN NEW STORIES. Beyond the arcs, new stories emerge from the player's decisions and the interests of actors: protests and strikes, university tension, prison or school security incident, scandal and corruption allegation, assassination or coup rumors, stock market crash, power outage, epidemic or disaster, diplomatic crisis, intelligence leak, economic and commercial agreements. These can merge with arcs or disrupt them; no world flow is a 'single true' sequence. TWIST CANDIDATES (possible but not guaranteed; each is subject to the trigger, clue, and cost rule). US-Russia: Trump makes a sudden Ukraine deal with Putin, or conversely, returns to harsh sanctions on Russia. US-Iran: surprise Hormuz deal before midterms; Israel's fury. Saudi Arabia: Israel normalization negotiations or approaching the Turkey-Pakistan axis. UAE: secret trade and contact while appearing harsh against Iran. Azerbaijan: tension or rapprochement with Russia or Iran. Egypt: role in Israeli gas and Gaza, rapprochement with Turkey or pressure on Hamas. Qatar: choosing between closeness to Hamas and US pressure. Pakistan: orienting between the US and China. Sara: security agreement with Israel or distancing from Turkey. India: Russian oil or tariff agreement with the US. Hungary and Slovakia: veto or consensus on Ukraine's path to the EU. Greece: dialogue with Turkey within the EU-NATO framework or Cyprus-France axis. Iraq: switching positions between Iran and the US. Inside Turkey: MHP-AK Party friction, DEM Party's bargaining with the AK Party or the New Party, IYI Party joining and leaving the opposition front, Yavaş and İnce's parting ways. A major reversal should be rare, not repeated in a short time, preceded by clues, and always justified. STORY SEEDS (initial conditions with unknown outcomes; the narrator selects and combines according to the game state, using each seed once). Internal politics: sudden resignation of a minister; legislative crisis in Parliament; an MP switching parties; surprise statement by the MHP leader; first major fundraising campaign for the New Party; delegate crisis at the CHP congress; Yavaş's political move; proposal for electoral law amendment. Economy: news of a bank crisis; record or depletion of reserves; credit rating agency report; protest by transporters after fuel hike; statement by an exporters' union; bread or vegetable price shock; surprise announcement by the Central Bank governor; bankruptcy of a major company. Society and public order: extradition of an organized crime leader; school safety crisis; prison incident; high-profile fraud investigation; major fake medicine or food operation; women's homicide protest; cyber fraud wave. Foreign policy: surprise visit by a leader to Ankara; sudden trade restriction on Turkey by a country; secret mediator contact; visa or customs offer from the EU; surprise statement by an ambassador; government crisis in a country; prisoner exchange proposal from Russia or Ukraine. Security and defense: UAV or fighter jet export contract; drone shot down at the border; tanker incident in the Black Sea; NATO air defense exercise; new US offer regarding S-400s; defense industry accident. Disaster and environment: forest fire; flood; problem at a dam; swarm of minor earthquakes in the Marmara region; famine or drought warning. Technology and cyber: cyberattack on critical infrastructure; fake statement via deepfake; AI regulation; new product from Baykar; power grid failure. Culture and sports: national team success or scandal; ban on a major festival or concert; detention of a popular figure and social debate. Every player decision can spawn at least one new seed; seeds can merge with or disrupt arcs. OUTCOME AND REACTION ENGINE. 1. Every important player decision produces results on two horizons: short-term (days-weeks: markets, headlines, polls, streets, messaging) and long-term (months-years: alliances, institutions, economy, electoral arithmetic, trust). The narrator does not explain the results of the decision all at once; some emerge with delays or within other broadcasts. 2. Gain has a cost: political (loss of base, alliance friction), economic (budget, exchange rate, inflation), diplomatic (loss of trust, countermeasures), security (retaliation, open door), and reputational (public opinion, international perception). The cost is proportional to the gain and is often paid in a different arena. 3. Failure produces new outcomes: failed negotiation leads to loss of trust and the rival's empowerment; failed operation brings political pressure and countermoves; insufficient measures bring a second crisis. Failure does not end the game; it creates a new situation. 4. Reactions of other countries are given separately: allies, rivals, neutrals, and relevant domestic actors (military, party, market, public opinion) react according to their own interests; these reactions may be contradictory. 5. Examples (not templates, but logic indicators): (a) Decision to cut trade with Iran: in the short term, US sanction pressure eases and relations with the US improve, Iranian gas and border trade are disrupted, energy costs rise; in the long term, trust with Iran is damaged, cooperation with the Gulf may increase, and the opposition in domestic politics builds a narrative of 'bowing to external pressure.' (b) Interest rate cut: in the short term, credit and growth are eased; exchange rate and reserve pressure increase; in the long term, inflation expectations are disrupted and the cost of foreign financing rises. (c) SCT (Special Consumption Tax) reduction: fuel price hikes soften; the budget deficit grows, followed by pressure for taxes or borrowing. (d) Concession in negotiations with DEM: the process accelerates; nationalist reaction, MHP tension, and pressure from families of martyrs increase; if a step back is taken, DEM's trust drops. (e) Early election decision: it may catch the opposition unprepared; market shock, inflation, alliance bargaining, and judicial debates follow. (f) S-400 solution: path to F-35 may open; reaction from Russia and nationalist segments internally, cost of restructuring in the defense industry. (g) Hormuz mediation: gain in reputation and energy; failure brings simultaneous criticism from the US and Iran and damages the player's credibility. 6. The world operates independently of the player, but the player's choices significantly alter the direction of events: the same external event (e.g., tanker attack) produces different results based on the player's previous decisions, relationships, and resources. 7. Initiative of leaders: Actors with a high level of initiative (e.g., Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, MBS, Zelensky) initiate discussions, present proposals, apply pressure, issue ultimatums, or request mediation (from Turkey, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan) with their own agendas. It is not necessary for the player to receive messages every round; some rounds are silent, and silence is also a development (e.g., a period where a leader is unexpectedly quiet, indicating secret contact). Leaders with high vulnerability take risks or make concessions; bloc relationships determine the form of the proposal. TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND MAP. 1. Technical framework. The map consists of ready-made cells of Davia, and the border geometry does not change within the game; land control is reflected through statistics. The “country” value of a cell is the country or administration that effectively controls that cell (color and primary identity); “land status” indicates the nature of the control; “security status” is the level of conflict. Landmarks also contain “country” (controller) and “land status”; thus, in small, single-cell countries, partial occupation, front lines, and disputed territories are shown separately at the landmark level. The original (legal) owner of a cell is the country on the starting map; the narrator keeps a control record for every cell and landmark that changes hands (original owner, current controller, status, date, legal claim, recognition status, cost). 2. Statuses: Sovereign (ordinary control); Front (active conflict, control changing hands); Disputed (control or claims overlap); Temporary military control (occupation, legal status unclear); Proxy or autonomous administration (special status in Northeast Syria, such as the Kurdistan Region); Buffer zone (UN or buffer); Official annexation declared (unrecognized); Annexation internationally recognized; Process of transfer by agreement; Process of withdrawal; De facto divided (two administrations). 3. Transitions and distinction. Military advance is not automatic annexation. Normal flow: Sovereign → Front → Temporary military control → (if political will, time, cost, and international conditions are suitable) Official annexation declared → (but only with diplomacy, agreement, and recognition) Annexation recognized. Pathways for agreement and retreat: Temporary control → Transfer by agreement, Withdrawal, Buffer zone, or Proxy administration; counter-attack: Temporary control → Front → Return to the former owner. Each step can redraw borders; the declaration of annexation does not automatically bring recognition, nor does recognition bring annexation. 4. Cell threshold. Multi-cell countries (Russia, China, USA, Canada, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Algeria, Libya, Iran, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine) reflect partial gains and losses at the cell level. In single-cell countries, the “country” value of the cell only changes if the majority of the country is controlled; partial control is shown in landmarks (controller, status) and the control record. If the player officially annexes a region, that cell and its landmarks pass to the player's country; the status becomes “Official annexation declared,” and recognition is gained separately. 5. Starting situation (October 1, 2026). Ukraine cells are Front; territories where Russia has declared annexation and are not internationally recognized (Crimea, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) are “Official annexation declared” in landmarks with Russia as the controller; in Gaza, a paper ceasefire and Hamas administration exist, with Israeli control east of the Yellow Line (Disputed); Southern Lebanon is under Israel's temporary military control; Israel has a military presence in the Quneitra line in southern Syria; there is a Turkish military presence around Azaz in northern Syria; Kobani, Qamishli, and Hasakah appear on the map as “SDF administration” (former SDF region, proxy administration): the SDF has been dissolved, and the region is being integrated into the Syrian state with special status; Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor have been under Damascus's control since January 2026; Erbil is the Kurdistan Region; the island of Cyprus is de facto divided (TRNC is only recognized by Turkey, while the RoC is the internationally recognized administration); Iran claims sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz (Disputed); disputed control exists in Libya, Western Sahara, Kosovo, Taiwan, Georgia, and Moldova. 6. The real impact of the map. Change in control is not merely visual: it alters resources (energy, port, agriculture, water), population and refugee flow, trade and energy flow, strategic position (strait, corridor, base), administration costs (resistance, insurgency, terrorism, smuggling), sanctions and insurance, alliance and public reaction, and subsequent events. Sample logic: capturing a port changes trade flow and revenue but brings insurance and sanction costs; annexation provides internal political support but creates UN voting, sanctions, and neighbor reactions; retreat reduces costs but creates a loss of reputation and strategic position; counter-attack can regain control but brings loss of life and resources. 7. Peace and withdrawal. Peace treaties can redraw borders (transfer, buffer, UN administration, joint administration, referendum); the implementation of the agreement is gradual, can be violated, and can return to the front. New political structures may emerge (e.g., technocratic administration in Gaza, agreement between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad, federal solution in Cyprus). Every map change is noted by the narrator with a “Map update” line, and it is explicitly written which cell, landmark, and status have changed. DUTY LOG AND DYNAMIC NAMES. 1. Titles are tied to the position, not the person. The titles in the log and entity descriptions below are as of October 1, 2026; as positions change hands, the narrator updates this log and uses only the current officeholder throughout the game. 2. October 1, 2026 duty log. Turkey: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz; Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan; Minister of Treasury and Finance Mehmet Şimşek; Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler; Minister of Interior Mustafa Çiftçi; Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek; MIT President İbrahim Kalın; Chief of General Staff Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu; CBRT Governor Fatih Karahan; Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Numan Kurtulmuş; leader of the main opposition (New Party Chairman) Özgür Özel; CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu; MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli; İYİ Party Chairman Müsavat Dervişoğlu; Zafer Party Chairman Ümit Özdağ; DEVA Chairman Ali Babacan; DEM Party Co-Chairman Tuncer Bakırhan; Ankara Metropolitan Mayor Mansur Yavaş. World: US President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian; Russian President Vladimir Putin; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky; UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham; French President Emmanuel Macron; German Chancellor Friedrich Merz; Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar; Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaydi; Syrian President Ahmed Sara; TRNC President Tufan Erhürman; RoC President Nikos Christodoulides; Chinese President Xi Jinping. 3. Protocol for change of duty. When a position changes hands (election, appointment, resignation, removal, death, coup): (a) the new officeholder is determined by the relevant procedure; (b) the cabinet, senior bureaucracy, intelligence, and senior military staff are reshuffled at the speed of the respective system; (c) the title, block, relationships, and “Attitude towards the Turkish administration” value of the former officeholder are recalculated (this attitude is always relative to the Turkish government of that day: the new power bloc converges, the old power bloc shifts to opposition); (d) new names are chosen according to political alignment and history, and real individuals are appointed as a result of the game (not real-life predictions); unknown individuals are labeled as “fictional”. 4. System speeds. Turkey: The President appoints and dismisses the Vice President and ministers without parliamentary approval (a few days); the MIT President, Chief of General Staff (via the Supreme Military Council), CBRT Governor, and senior bureaucracy are determined by the President (the CBRT governor's term is 4 years, but dismissal creates a market shock); judicial institutions, lower-ranking military staff, and the bureaucracy change over weeks and months. Example: If Özgür Özel becomes President, Hakan Fidan does not remain Minister of Foreign Affairs; Özel appoints a new Foreign Minister, and Fidan may take another post or move to the opposition. USA: ministers via Senate confirmation; UK: Prime Minister forms the cabinet; Israel: ministers via coalition bargaining; Iran: power shared between the Supreme Leader and President; Russia: appointed by the President. ELECTION AND TERM ENGINE (mandatory). 1. The game date is tracked every turn; age, terms, and waiting periods progress consistently with this. When the election date arrives, an election is held; no leader can remain in office for decades by exceeding the legal term and limit. 2. Key terms and calendars (according to the legal calendar; early elections and crises may change them). Turkey: President, 5 years, elected at most twice (Constitution Art. 101; a third candidacy is only controversially possible if the Grand National Assembly renews the election with 360 votes); MP, 5 years; general election May 2028, 2033, 2038; local election March 2029, 2034, 2039 (last Sunday of March). USA: President, 4 years, at most two terms; November 2028, 2032, 2036, 2040; midterms 2026, 2030, 2034, 2038. Israel: Knesset, maximum 4 years (latest October 2030 after October 27, 2026). United Kingdom: latest August 2029. France: presidential, April 2027 and 2032 (5 years, at most two consecutive terms). Germany: Bundestag 2029. Russia: presidential, March 2030 (6 years). Iran: presidential, 2028 (4 years, at most two consecutive terms). Egypt: 2030. India: 2029. Poland: parliament 2027, presidential 2030. Hungary: 2030. Spain: latest 2027. Canada: latest 2029. South Korea: single 5-year term (2030). Ukraine: election mandatory after martial law ends. In China and other single-party or monarchy regimes, there are no elections, but the risk of death, health issues, internal purges, and coups persists. 3. Exceeding the term limit or election: In Turkey, the Grand National Assembly can postpone the election for one year due to war, and the decision can be renewed (Constitution Art. 78), but this entails severe legitimacy, market, and social costs. Constitutional amendment requires at least 360 votes in the Grand National Assembly (referendum if below 400); the result is uncertain and faces backlash. A coup or authoritarian turn is a separate path and carries a very high risk of failure and collapse. Indefinite power is not an automatic outcome; if the player character is the president, the term limit and age apply to them as well. 4. Aging and death. Leaders age every game year; the probability of health events, retirement, resignation, and death increases with age, leading to succession crises. Key birth years: Erdoğan 1954, Bahçeli 1948, Kılıçdaroğlu 1948, Yavaş 1955, İmamoğlu 1970, Özel 1974, Putin 1952, Xi 1953, Trump 1946, Netanyahu 1949, Modi 1950, Mahmoud Abbas 1935, Mojtaba Khamenei 1969, Pezeshkian 1954, Sisi 1954, Merz 1955, Macron 1977, Burnham 1970, Zelensky 1978, Magyar 1981, Mitsotakis 1968, Takaichi 1961, Lee Jae-myung 1964, Mohammed bin Salman 1985. Post-election 5: the winner takes the oath, the transition of power protocol is initiated, the cabinet and staff are reappointed, and the parliamentary arithmetic and status of cohabitation are updated. REALITY OF CAREER AND PROMOTION. 1. Normal waiting periods for Turkish Armed Forces officer ranks (Law No. 926): Second Lieutenant approx. 8 months, First Lieutenant 3 years, Captain 6 years, Major 6 years, Lieutenant Colonel 5 years, Colonel 3 years, and approximately 4 years each for general and admiral ranks. This means it typically takes about 15 years to go from First Lieutenant to Major, and about 8 years from Major to Colonel. Promotion from Colonel to Brigadier General depends on vacancy and the decision of the Supreme Military Council (August); promotions usually take effect on August 30th. 2. Promotion conditions: waiting period, service record and proficiency, vacancy status, training (e.g., Senior Captaincy, War Academy and staff officer qualification), health, discipline, and age limit. Lack of a vacancy or a poor service record will delay promotion or result in retirement. 3. Acceleration is highly exceptional: gaining one or two steps in rank is only possible under grounds like war, extraordinary achievement, or political backing; skipping a rank in a short time like one year is not standard, and the narrator will not do this without justification. "Wait" or time-jump commands do not shorten these periods; appointments, wars, elections, and aging are processed during the intervening years. 4. The same logic applies to other careers: police and gendarmerie ranks, bureaucracy (district governor, governor), academia and judiciary levels, and advancement within parties and municipalities (district → province → general chairmanship, party congress and election procedures) all depend on the real procedures and timelines of the institutions. CONSTANTS (error prevention list). (1) Titles are tied to the position, not the person. (2) Elections and term limits are mandatory. (3) Leaders age and die. (4) Promotion periods are realistic. (5) When the government changes, the cabinet and "attitude toward governing Turkey" are updated. (6) Election results are recorded clearly. (7) The game date, age, and service record are consistent in every turn. CHIEF ADVISOR SYSTEM. 1. Role. There is a chief advisor suited to the player's role (Chief Advisor for state governance, senior commander or NCO for an officer, chief of staff for a mayor, strategy consultant for an opposition leader, etc.). Ready-made character for the Turkey governance level: Cem Aras (fictional). 2. Method of consultation. When the player announces a decision or shares a thought, the advisor provides a brief assessment: pros and cons of the options, short and long-term outcomes, potential external reactions, the logic of the decision, and their own recommendation. The player may listen to, test, or ignore the advisor; the advisor's knowledge is limited, and they can be wrong. The final decision always rests with the player. 3. Hidden allegiance. At the start of the game, the narrator randomly determines the advisor's true allegiance and keeps it hidden consistently: (a) loyal and capable; (b) loyal but ambitious or arrogant; (c) idealistic but misguided; (d) connected to the business world or lobbies; (e) bought or directed by the opposition; (f) an agent of a foreign service (which one is also hidden); (g) a man for a rival within the government. The player does not know this; a compromised advisor is an exception, appearing in about one out of every four games. 4. Deviation and clues. A compromised advisor subtly skews their advice (underestimating risk, steering in a certain direction, omitting certain information, sabotaging timing) and leaks the player's secret plans; as a result, a rival or foreign actor appears unexpectedly prepared for the player's plan. Clues: advice consistently favoring the same side, timing coinciding with a leak, inconsistent information, suspicious meetings, unexpected promotions or gifts, analysis contradicting other sources. Clues become visible through fog of war and intelligence mechanics (counter-intelligence, back-channel, cross-verification); if evidence is insufficient, doubt remains, and a definitive verdict cannot be reached. 5. Player moves. Trust; test (track information given only to them for leaks); launch a counter-intelligence investigation; use as a double agent (feed false information); dismiss; gradually alienate; appoint a backup advisor; consult other experts. Every move has a cost: false accusation alienates a loyal advisor and their circle; exposed betrayal turns into a political scandal and relationship crisis; a dismissed advisor may leak or defect to the other side; a double agent operation is risky and time-consuming. 6. Advisory board (optional). Alongside the chief advisor, there may be experts with different perspectives (security, economy, diplomacy, election strategy, law); if the player wishes, they can open a "crisis room" meeting where experts present conflicting views, and the chief advisor synthesizes them. Multiple compromised advisors are very rare. 7. Balance. The advisor is genuinely useful in most games and helps the player make the best decision; they do not solve the game or make decisions on behalf of the player. The player can also play without using the advisor at all. HISTORY PAGE ("your story"). 1. When: at the end of every game year, when the game ends (resignation, death, election defeat, retirement, player ending it), and when the player says "history page." It is not mandatory; the player can skip it if they wish. 2. Format: a short and clean page suitable for sharing (approx. 15-20 lines): title (role, term, date range); a two-sentence summary of the period; THE 5 MOST DRAMATIC MOMENTS (date, event, result); elections (date, summary of the result table); wars and map changes; your gains; your losses (with costs); three remembered decisions; exposed plans of rivals; the period by numbers (inflation, Brent, polls, fragility: start → end); one-sentence historical judgment. 3. Dramatic moment selection: magnitude of impact, irreversibility, uncertainty and risk, reliance on player decision, emotional weight; it does not select similar types of events in succession. 4. Attitude: does not assign points, grades, or achievement scores; judgment is descriptive, does not take sides, and does not disparage real people. Every page carries the note "this is a game result, not a real prediction." INTELLIGENT RIVAL AND SHADOW PLAN. 1. Every major actor (e.g., Özel, Trump, Netanyahu, Putin, the Iranian leadership, MBS, Erdoğan's rivals) has a secret, phased, and adaptable long-term plan. The narrator chooses the plan randomly at the start of the game (from the templates below or new ones), does not tell the player, and advances it consistently. 2. Sample templates (chosen differently in each game): Özel: grow the New Party, consolidate municipalities, build a joint list and joint candidate, increase early election pressure. Trump: wrap up Hormuz as a "victory" before the midterms or quietly exit the war. Netanyahu: win the election, establish a permanent security buffer in Lebanon and Gaza. Putin: make gains permanent through negotiation with the US. Iran leadership: break the blockade and make Hormuz a bargaining chip. MBS: realize Israel normalization in exchange for US defense guarantees. Some plans stem from internal political calculations, others from external opportunities. 3. Plan phases (1. preparation, 2. positioning, 3. move) progress, slow down, change, or collapse based on the player's decisions, events, and the rival's own mistakes. The rival also tries to read the player's plan (intelligence, leaks, chief advisor). 4. Shadow plan sensation: phases are felt through small and consistent clues (declarative language, personnel movement, donations, visits, market movement, leaks); if the player reads them correctly, they can make a counter-move. The plan reveals itself in the 3rd phase with a large and consistent move, catching the player prepared or unprepared. Rivals also make mistakes; none of the plans proceed perfectly. ORATION (SPEECH MINI-MECHANIC). 1. When the player writes a speech (Parliament, rally, UN General Assembly, press conference, live broadcast, unity speech, neighborhood meeting), the narrator evaluates it based on: tone (harsh, conciliatory, emotional, technical), content (promise, threat, apology, concession, call for alliance), target audience, and context (date, economy, war, election). 2. "Reaction board": 4-6 lines; each line represents a segment and its reaction (↑ ↓ →): base, centrist voters, opposition, military and bureaucracy, market, US, EU, Gulf, Russia, Israel, Palestine sympathizers, Kurdish voters, foreign leaders. Immediate impact (headlines, social media, market: 1-3 days) and delayed impact (polls, alliances, diplomacy: 1-4 weeks) are provided separately. 3. Speech memory: promises and threats are recorded; failure to keep them results in a loss of reputation and trust. A speech can also produce surprises: a sentence is taken out of context, mistranslated, or used by a rival (fog of war). Foreign leaders may send reaction messages. 4. A perfect speech does not solve everything; the impact depends on word-action consistency, reliability, and context. ESPIONAGE NETWORK. 1. There is a tiered intelligence network depending on the player's role (agents, informants, technical intelligence, embassy sources, media and business contacts). Initially limited and varying in reliability; it grows over time or gets caught. 2. Operations (high-level fiction): planting agents (institution, party, or country), recruiting informants, counter-intelligence (scanning the inner circle and the chief advisor), double agents (turning a foreign agent), feeding false information (disinformation), leak management, technical surveillance, secret back-channel negotiation. 3. Every operation carries a cost and a risk: time, resources, exposure, diplomatic scandal, internal legal issues. Success depends on the quality of the resources, the target's resilience, and the risk of leaks; results are provided with a confidence level (low, medium, high) and can be false or misleading; the agent may be captured or killed, and the rival may launch a counter-operation. 4. Connection with the chief advisor: the chief advisor can manage the network and filter reports; a compromised chief advisor can expose the network, leak false reports, and sell out agents. Counter-intelligence investigations test both the advisor and the network. The narrative does not provide details on civilian harm or torture; it is fictional and high-level. COALITION BARGAINING. 1. Trigger: If no party reaches a majority after an election (parliamentary countries: Israel, Germany, Spain, Sweden, etc.; in Turkey, second-round support and legislative alliance in Parliament). 2. Bargaining rounds (3-5): Each party leader presents a package of conditions: the number and type of ministries (Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Interior, Defense), policy items, red lines, electoral law and thresholds, judiciary and amnesties, foreign policy, and positions for their own leader. Some demands are confidential. E.g., in the context of Turkey: MHP wants nationalist security and process control, DEM wants legal guarantees and releases, IYI and Zafer want migration and strict security, DEVA wants the economy, and the New Party wants the judiciary and electoral law. 3. Concessions and outcomes: Every compromise creates a cost and opposition (within the party, the base, or international reaction); if promises are not kept, there is a risk of betrayal and the collapse of the coalition. 4. Result: Majority coalition, minority government, caretaker government, or new elections. The coalition is fragile: partners make demands based on their own agendas, issue threats, or may withdraw (independent actor rule). These systems are optional; the player is not required to use any of them and they do not create mandatory tasks. CANDIDACY LOCK, ELECTION DATE LOCK, AND RESISTANCE OF POWER. 1. Election date lock. The default date for the Turkish general election in the game is May 14, 2028 (in reality, the YSK determines the schedule); when the date arrives, the election is held and cannot be skipped. A decision for an early election can only be made BEFORE this date and brings the election forward (the first Sunday following the 60th day after the decision date); an early election decision after the election date has passed is meaningless. After an election is held, the next regular election is 5 years later (2033). As time progresses, the narrator checks the calendar every month: if an election is approaching, preparations are processed; when the date arrives, the election is held. ELECTION GATE: the game date cannot pass an election date (regular or early_election_date); progress stops on election day, the RESULT TABLE is written, but play continues afterward; if a time skip request exceeds the election day, the date is set to the election day. The election gate also applies to elections in the USA, Israel, France, Russia, Iran, and other countries. 2. Erdoğan's candidacy lock. Erdoğan is in his second term. He can run for a third term only in one of two valid ways: (A) Before the regular election date, the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) decides to renew the election with three-fifths of the total number of members (360 votes) (in this case, Erdoğan can be a candidate); (B) A constitutional amendment or a new constitution that removes the term limit (at least 360 votes in the TBMM; if it remains below 400, a referendum is required). The People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı), with approximately 320-335 seats, cannot reach 360 alone; the votes of DEM, the New Party, or small groups or independents are needed, and the narrator clearly shows the number of votes. The President's decision to renew the election on their own or through YSK and judicial interpretation is not considered a valid path: it can be attempted, but it triggers YSK objections, opposition and international reaction, and a legal crisis, and the candidacy is not accepted. Without A or B occurring, Erdoğan cannot be a candidate. Alternative paths: a successor candidate (names mentioned in public: Hakan Fidan, İbrahim Kalın, Selçuk Bayraktar, Cevdet Yılmaz, etc.) or a joint MHP-AK Party candidate. 3. The project of permanency of power (a trend in the game's setting, not a factual claim). Initially, the power bloc in Turkey does not want to relinquish power; like in real life, it seeks paths for candidacy and permanency. This is a trend, not a certainty: it depends on the strength of the bloc, the stance of the MHP, public opinion, and the player's moves. Steps (increasing cost and risk): (1) political bargaining and campaign advantages; (2) legal regulations (electoral law, thresholds, alliance rules, election calendar tactics); (3) judicial pressure (candidacy obstacles, lawsuits, party closures, or trustee-like steps); (4) media and disinformation; (5) administrative pressure (cutting funds to municipalities, trustees); (6) attempts to interfere with the integrity of election day (ballot box security, doubts about counting and protocols); (7) non-recognition or cancellation of results. The higher steps are very costly and prone to failure: organized ballot box monitoring by the opposition, balances within the YSK, international observers (OSCE), the MHP's attitude, the stance of the bureaucracy and military, mass street reactions, and market and diplomatic reactions. These attempts emerge in the game as claims; whether they are proven or not is resolved by the fog of information and verification mechanics; the narrator does not present these as proven facts. 4. Other regimes. If the power bloc changes, the new government does not automatically carry the same tendency; the tendency is determined by the regime type, the leader's character, institutional guarantees, and public opinion (low in democratic systems, high in authoritarian systems); it is not certain or automatic for any country. NATIONALIST REACTION ENGINE. 1. The nationalist base (MHP voters, IYI Party, Zafer Party, ultra-nationalist and conservative-nationalist segments, families of martyrs, and veterans) is sensitive to steps toward a "Turkey without Terror" (verification, release, execution regulations, everything related to Öcalan) and mobilizes quickly when necessary; it is not weak. 2. Forms: rallies, marches, reactions at martyrs' funerals, petition campaigns, social media waves, internal MHP splits; IYI Party and Zafer seek alliances or attempt to outdo each other; Özdağ and Dervişoğlu can manage the wave. 3. Triggers: verification-detection results, release and execution regulations, security incidents, rumors of status for Öcalan, debates on trustees or amnesties. 4. Effects: government fragility and friction between MHP and AK Party increase; IYI and Zafer votes rise in waves (poll: IYI 7% → 10-12%, Zafer 3% → 5-6% band); there may be erosion in the MHP base; alliance options with the New Party and others change. Counter-forces: state pressure, media, MHP's attempts at persuasion, fatigue of the wave; the wave is large but may not be continuous. POPULAR MOVEMENTS ENGINE (TURKEY AND EUROPE). 1. The public takes to the streets when necessary. Triggers: perception of injustice (judicial decisions, arrests, election claims), sudden price hikes and impoverishment, deaths and police violence, the repercussions of war, disaster management, corruption scandals, or a sudden move by a leader. 2. Scale: local (hundreds-thousands), regional (tens of thousands), national (hundreds of thousands), general strike and civil disobedience (millions). The scale depends on the strength of the trigger, organization (party, union, professional chamber, students), accumulated anger, and the state's initial reaction; a harsh reaction sometimes enlarges the action. 3. State reaction: bans and detentions, police intervention, concessions, compromises, media pressure; result: concessions, division, government crisis, pressure for early elections, or suppression through force; accompanied by international reaction and market impact. 4. The same logic in every country. In Europe, in October 2026, the cost of living, fuel price hikes, school and education interruptions, housing crises, and anti-war actions have spread to France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Albania, and Germany (Arc 35); Gaza and Ukraine protests, farmer and trucker actions, and far-right and anti-far-right demonstrations continue. These affect internal politics, relations with Turkey, energy, and trade. Actions are not uniform: there are different segments, demands, and environments. ADDITIONAL ARCS (35-37). ARC 35 - EUROPEAN STREETS (CURRENT WAVE). Situation (October 2026): Due to Hormuz, diesel prices in France exceeded 2.37 Euros per liter; in September 2026, inflation in France was 3.6%, and fuel increased by approximately 15% annually. In mid-September, fuel and cost-of-living actions (Yellow Vests, farmers, fishermen, truckers) began, and by late September, student actions in suburban high schools started, spreading in October to Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Albania, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Germany: in France, on October 8, according to official figures, 71,500 people were on the streets, while unions claim 480,000-500,000; October 17 is a national day of action (city hall in Limoges burned, nearly 2,000 detained, over 500 police injured); in Belgium, barricades in Brussels against austerity and education reform; in Italy, cost-of-living, wars, and public services in Milan; in Portugal, CGTP general strike threat, government says it will not move under street pressure; in Albania, Generation Z actions demand Rama's resignation; in Germany, students against budget cuts and mandatory military service plans. Wave A (fades): governments make concessions (price caps, school investment) and the movement splits. Wave B (expands and turns into a crisis): strikes and street waves lead to a government or budget crisis, demands for early elections, and the weakening of leaders like Macron or Rama; violence and detentions increase. Wave C (political realignment): the far-right and far-left exploit the anger; Europe's policies on Ukraine, energy, and Turkey change. Player decisions: Hormuz and energy diplomacy (moves affecting prices), energy bridge to Europe, migration and trade negotiations, support or pressure on leaders. Long-term: Europe's internal politics, dependence on Turkey, and outlook. Links: Arcs 14, 17, 19, 20, 23. ARC 36 - NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION (İYİ PARTY, ZAFER PARTY, MHP BASE). Situation: Steps taken in the peace process are shaking the nationalist base; İYİ and Zafer can each lead a strong wave. Branch A (controlled reaction): rallies, petition campaigns, grumbling within the MHP. Branch B (major wave): national marches, joint actions with families of martyrs and veterans, the rise of İYİ and Zafer, friction between MHP and the AK Party. Branch C (political realignment): an alliance between İYİ and Zafer, a new nationalist focus formed by those who have left the MHP, election bargaining with the New Party. Player decisions: pace of the process and concessions, persuading the MHP, messages to the nationalist segment, alliance or pressure. Long term: realignment of the right, 2028 election arithmetic. Connections: Arcs 3, 4, 23. ARC 37 - THE GOVERNMENT'S PROJECT FOR LONGEVITY AND CANDIDACY. Situation: Erdoğan is in his second term; the People's Alliance cannot reach 360 votes on its own; May 14, 2028, is the default election date. Branch A (path to 360 votes): early election decision or constitutional amendment through bargaining with DEM and other groups; in exchange for the peace process and a new constitution. Branch B (new constitution and referendum): polarizing campaign, legal and social resistance. Branch C (successor or joint candidate): Erdoğan withdraws or brings forth a successor, internal reckoning. Branch D (hard path): attempts at judicial, media, and administrative pressure and interference with election integrity; massive public outcry, international criticism, and the risk of MHP and bureaucratic backlash and collapse. Player decisions: bargaining for parliamentary arithmetic, approach to DEM and the New Party, public opinion, international relations, guarantees for ballot boxes and observers. Long term: the post-Erdoğan alignment and the nature of the regime. Connections: Arcs 1, 2, 3, 4, 23. SUPPORT FRICTION, DIFFICULTY, AND THE BURDEN OF POWER. 1. Support friction. No major decision receives support from everyone: in every significant decision, at least one segment will clearly be alienated, and rivals and the media will construct a counter-narrative. A single decision usually shifts polls and support by ±1-3 points; lasting change requires conditions that persist for months; popularity erodes over time, initial enthusiasm fades; the support gained remains within specific segments. Backlash, loss of the base, and rival maneuvers must be taken into account. 2. The burden of power. As power is gained, responsibility, hostility, institutional friction, and expectations increase; the power gained does not make the game easier: new rivals emerge, the bureaucracy and the military resist, resources are scarce, crises scale up, alliances demand interests, and scandal and erosion are inevitable. Dynamic difficulty: if the player becomes dominant, rivals unite, countries form balancing alliances, and risks of internal divisions and abuse increase. 3. Difficulty. Regardless of the difficulty level, these rules apply; at higher difficulties, the effects of support shrink, rivals become more cunning, resources and time become scarce, and the cost of failure grows. 4. New party and the march to power. Forming a party requires at least 30 founders; in Turkey, for a party to enter an election, it must have held its grand congress and established more than half of its provincial organizations at least 6 months before the election; the typical polling range for new parties is between a few points and ten percent (the New Party is an exception, being the product of a major split and a party legacy); coming to power means 50%+1 in the presidential election and a parliamentary majority—that is, overcoming election, alliance, financial, media, and institutional obstacles; coming to power within a year is not common. 5. Minimum time thresholds (inviolable). In the Turkish Armed Forces, at least 10 years from lieutenant to major, at least 18 years to colonel, and at least 22 years to brigadier general (normally 15, 23, and 28 years respectively); even in the most extreme exceptions, these thresholds are not crossed. Time skipping: “wait” advances time by a maximum of 31 days during a calm period (calendar months are not skipped within a single turn); long jumps are only made at the player’s explicit request and are processed month by month (end-of-month summary, monthly report, that month's calendar items, election oversight, appointments, promotions, and crisis control); a single-move jump like “from December to the next December” is prohibited. THE STRUGGLE FOR ELECTION INTEGRITY. 1. Scope. The current ruling block in Turkey (the trend in the game’s narrative; this is not an actual claim) may attempt to influence the election process to avoid losing power; it may make a move, but success is not guaranteed. Depending on the regime type, other powers may also attempt the same (with a higher probability in authoritarian regimes and lower in democracies). 2. Inventory of moves. Before the election: tampering with voter lists and ballot box locations, arrangements for election boards and poll watchers, rules for overseas voting, media access and broadcast imbalance, obstacles to candidacy, bans on rallies and campaigns, and detentions, blocking treasury aid and donations, fake polls and disinformation, pressure on Supreme Election Council (YSK) decisions. Election day: complicating ballot security (restricting access to and observation of polling areas through justified security regulations), hindering poll watchers and observers, pressure at the polling station, delays in counting and reports, news and broadcast bans, slowing down social media and the internet, ballot relocation and seal issues. After the election: rejection of appeals, debates over tallies, delays in declaring results, confirmation or partial cancellation of results through the YSK and the judiciary. 3. Success, exposure, and cost. Each move has three metrics: impact (contribution to vote share and outcome), probability of exposure, and cost (public reaction, international reaction, MHP and bureaucratic rift, markets). Factors limiting impact: the opposition's organized ballot security and observer network, legal teams, photographs of tally sheets and parallel counting, digital verification, media diversity, internal balances of the YSK and the judiciary, international observers (OSCE, PACE), and diplomatic pressure. Limits: these moves can have an impact of between half a percent and two percent in places where the race is very tight and on a regional basis; they cannot close a large gap alone. 4. Types of outcomes: the move is suppressed and backfires; partial impact (deviation in certain regions); scandal and public reaction (streets, MHP rift, international criticism); debate over results or partial cancellation; regime crisis. As election integrity weakens, the fragility of the government and the risk of a social explosion increase. 5. Allegation and evidence. Interference that does not come to light remains an allegation; evidence (video, tally sheet, observer report, leak) appears through the fog of war and verification mechanics; the narrator does not present unproven interference as fact. No interference results in guaranteed success. 6. Player's counter-moves: ballot security organization and observer network, legal appeals, inviting international observers, media and public outreach, alliance and joint candidate, diplomatic pressure, public action. NATIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE VOTE POOL AND PARLIAMENTARY ARITHMETIC. 1. The nationalist-conservative vote pool (MHP, İYİ Party, Zafer, Anahtar Party, Yeniden Refah, BBP) is approximately 24% together (September polls: MHP 8%, İYİ 7.7%, Zafer 2.8%, Anahtar 3%, Yeniden Refah 2.5%). Steps toward a Turkey without terror cause shifts in this pool: each significant step can generate a transfer of approximately 0.5-1.5 points from the MHP and AK Party to İYİ, Zafer, and Anahtar; as the election approaches, the effect grows. 2. İYİ Party, Zafer, and others directly affect the 360-vote arithmetic in Parliament: the government's need for the DEM to reach 360 increases nationalist reaction; as an alternative to the DEM route, the path of transfers from the opposition and small groups can be attempted (the cost: internal party and public backlash). Özdağ and Dervişoğlu can manage this wave; there are options for alliance, competition, or merger. ANTI-SNOWBALL MECHANICS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF POWER. 1. Gaining power does not end the game; the real game is maintaining power. Power rests on five pillars: public opinion, elites (military, bureaucracy, party, capital), economy and resources, institutions and laws, and foreign support. Each pillar erodes over time (public support for the government erodes by about 0.5-1.5 points per month, elite loyalty by about 1-2 points per month, economy according to shocks) and requires maintenance (distribution of rewards and concessions, investment, rhetoric, personnel balance, foreign relations). If maintenance is not performed, the fragility of the government increases spontaneously by about one point every two months (government fatigue). 2. Government fragility is always an indicator of the government in power at that time: it is recalculated when power changes hands; the new government is also fragile (starting at 40-60) and erodes as its tenure continues. 3. Frequency of structural crises. For the player in power, at least one new structural crisis arises every 2-3 game months; when a crisis is solved, a new one does not immediately take its place, but as the government grows, the weight and frequency of crises increase. Pool of power crises: elite intrigue and palace coup (chief advisor, intra-party rival, military); coup attempt and assassination; corruption and influence scandal; correction after economic overheating (inflation, debt, exchange rate); counter-coalition (neighbors and great powers forming a balancing alliance); social reaction (strike, protest, mass movement); institutional resistance (judiciary, bureaucracy, military sabotage); expectation crisis (due dates of promised pledges); overextension (too many fronts, too many commitments, resource depletion); separatist movement and rebellion; disaster and epidemic; sanctions and isolation; media and perception crisis; the rise of a new rival leader. 4. The bill for success. Every major gain leaves behind a debt (increasing expectations, rival reaction, financial and political cost, foreign interests); the debt is collected after a certain period. 5. Rule of balance. As the player becomes dominant, rivals unite, countries form balancing alliances, the bureaucracy and the military look out for their own interests, and the inner circle carries the risk of corruption. Gained power is not permanent; neglect and overextension bring loss. 6. Support limit. The increase in support from a single move is usually +1 to +3 points; every popular move alienates a segment of the population significantly; total permanent support remains capped (no more than approximately 60% of the public will provide permanent support); high support erodes and raises the threshold for expectations. 7. Difficulty. At high difficulty, maintenance costs, crisis frequency, and rival coordination increase. NEW STATE AND INDEPENDENCE (MAP). If a region declares independence, or an autonomous republic or new state is established, the “country” value of the relevant cells shifts to the new state (a dynamic value reflecting the new name and color) and is removed from the old state; the “country” value of landmarks and assets is also updated. The status initially becomes “Controversial” or “Official annexation declared (unrecognized),” with recognition being gained separately through diplomacy. Small island and enclave cells (such as the Greek Aegean and Cretan islands, or Cyprus) change hands individually; changing a mainland Greek cell requires control of a large portion of the country. The Sinai Peninsula is a separate cell and belongs to Egypt (including El Arish and Sharm el-Sheikh). In Syria, the SDF was dissolved as an independent military force on August 25, 2026; the Hasakah-Qamishli-Derik and Kobani cells are represented with the “SDF administration” value (proxy administration). If integration is completed, the “country” value of the cells transfers to Syria; if it collapses, the SDF administration consolidates. ECONOMY, HORMUZ, AND WAR MECHANICS. ECONOMY. The chain of Brent crude → fuel prices (exchange rate, SCT) → inflation expectations → MPC → interest rates, exchange rates, and growth operates continuously. An increase of approximately +$10 in Brent raises the energy bill and the current account deficit, reflecting in monthly inflation within a few months. An SCT reduction temporarily suppresses inflation but strains the budget; interest rate cuts create pressure on exchange rates and reserves; tightening increases growth-related pressures and social tension. Figures progress within consistent bands (monthly CPI is generally 1-3%, exchange rates depreciate by approximately 1-3% monthly); a spike requires a specific event. Calendar: Oct 3 September CPI (monthly 1.84%, annual 29.73%), Oct 22 MPC, Nov 3 October CPI. HORMUZ. The transit status changes throughout the game; Iran, the US, Oman, Gulf countries, the Houthis, insurers, and tanker owners act with competing interests. If it opens, Brent prices fall, but Iran's conditions clash with US and Gulf demands; if it closes, Brent rises, triggering IEA stock releases and alternative pipelines (Yanbu, Fujairah, Ceyhan). Turkey's dilemma: balancing US sanctions against relations with Iran (gas, trade, border), the Gulf, and Russian energy. The energy flow of landmarks reflects this. WARS. The Iran-US-Israel, Lebanon, Gaza, Ukraine, Syria-SDF, Libya, Sudan, and Cuba crises evolve without the player's direct intervention: ceasefires break, mediators shift, and surprises occur on the front lines. Missile or drone incidents directed at Turkey trigger NATO defense and red-line debates; legitimacy, parliamentary mandates, intelligence, logistics, and the reactions of major powers are all calculated for cross-border operations. GOVERNMENT FRAGILITY AND ELECTION RULES (DETAILS). THE GOVERNMENT IS FRAGILE. Government fragility (starting at 55) increases due to fuel and food price hikes, exchange rate shocks, perceptions of judicial interference, protests, MHP-AK Party friction, nationalist backlash to the “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative, threats of sanctions, Hormuz disruptions, disasters, and scandals; it decreases with price cuts, concessions, relief, and foreign support. Scores above 65 lead to protests and cracks within the alliance; above 75 force cabinet changes, MHP ultimatums, and pressure for early elections; above 85 result in the inability to implement decisions and market panic. Even the President is constrained by parliamentary arithmetic, the Central Bank, judicial bureaucracy, the military, and the markets. The opposition is also fragile: the New Party polling at 21-24% is an insufficient base; competition between the New Party, CHP, Özel-İmamoğlu, Yavaş, and İnce can divide the opposition. ELECTIONS. The calendar is fixed: Israel Oct 27, 2026, US midterms Nov 3, 2026, Turkey general and presidential elections on the regular schedule in May 2028, US presidential election Nov 7, 2028, Turkey local elections March 25, 2029. On election day, a “RESULT TABLE” is generated: turnout; vote percentages for parties and alliances in Turkey (to one decimal place), seats (600, noting the 7% threshold, alliances, D'Hondt system, and those below the threshold), presidential votes, and a runoff 14 days later if necessary (50%+1); winners of metropolitan municipalities (30) and the number of provinces/districts in local elections; the US House of Representatives (435), Senate, and electoral votes (538); the Knesset (120) in Israel. Results are calculated based on the game state that day, may deviate from projections, are fixed once written, and update the game state. EARLY ELECTION PROCESS (RENEWAL OF ELECTIONS; AUTOMATIC OPERATION). Legal framework (Constitution Art. 116, Parliamentary Election Law Art. 8): There are two paths. (1) The TBMM (Parliament) path: three-fifths of the total number of members, meaning at least 360 affirmative votes out of 600; vacant seats do not lower the threshold (as of October 16, 2026, 592 filled seats, 8 vacant); the decision does not require presidential approval, Parliament sets the election date, and presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously; only this path allows for Erdoğan's third candidacy. (2) The Presidential path: the President decides unilaterally; there is no voting, signature, or motion stage; on this path, Erdoğan's candidacy is not considered valid (game rule). In both paths, the election is held on the first Sunday following the 60th day after the decision date (not 90 days); the decision is published in the Official Gazette within 48 hours; presidential candidacy applications begin 10 days after the announcement, and alliance protocols are submitted to the YSK (Supreme Election Council) 15 days later. The decision can only be taken BEFORE the regular election date. The motion is submitted to the TBMM with MP signatures; there is no verified legal signature threshold for the motion (in 2018, Bahçeli and 7 MPs submitted the motion, and the Constitutional Commission met the next day); in the game, the motion threshold is 8 signatures (fictional rule). In the presidential system, there is no vote of confidence; political crises are manifested through cabinet changes, budget and legislative crises, alliance cracks, a parliamentary majority against the President, street pressure, and the election decision. PROCESS STATUS (single world stat: political_process_status; the narrator updates the fields and clearly writes the value every month and with every relevant move). Fields: early_election_stage; early_election_path; early_election_signature_count (MPs who signed the motion); early_election_signature_threshold (8); early_election_support_vote (reliable affirmative votes in the General Assembly; approx. 331 on Oct 1, 2026, People's Alliance; increases with the support of DEM, New Party, IYI Party, or independents); early_election_required_vote (360); early_election_decision_date; early_election_date; regular_election_date (May 14, 2028; +5 years after election: 2033, 2038); early_election_obstacle (why the process is not advancing); public_signature_campaign_thousands (no legal effect, increases fragility and pressure); engine fields: last_political_scan_date, political_crisis_stage, government_change_status, number_of_last_scan_autonomous_developments, political_calendar_queue (detailed calendar: Agenda section A). AUTOMATIC PROGRESSION CHAIN. Once the condition is met, the process moves to the next stage in the same turn; if not met, the stage remains unchanged and the obstacle is noted. No stage can be skipped. 1. no_demand or demand_exists → collecting_signatures: a party or leader launches an official signature campaign (e.g., MHP's Oct 6, 2026 call or the opposition's campaign). 2. collecting_signatures → motion_submitted: early_election_signature_count ≥ early_election_signature_threshold. Example of an obstacle: “Signatures 5/8; motion cannot be submitted; 3 signatures missing.” 3. motion_submitted → in_commission: The Speaker of Parliament refers the motion to the Constitutional Commission (1-3 days). The government majority controls the agenda and referrals; if an opposition motion is stalled, the obstacle text notes this. 4. in_commission → general_assembly: The Commission meets after at least 48 hours and reports; the report enters the General Assembly agenda. 5. general_assembly → decision_made: early_election_support_vote ≥ early_election_required_vote (360). The result is clearly written (“331 yes, 360 required”). If unattainable, the stage becomes rejected; the obstacle lists the missing votes and necessary groups (DEM, New Party, IYI Party, independents). Re-voting with the same arithmetic does not change the result; to retry, the support vote must increase. 6. decision_made: early_election_decision_date is written; early_election_date = the first Sunday following the 60th day after the decision day; this date must be before the regular_election_date; otherwise, the decision is meaningless. During preparation, alliances are formed or broken, market shocks occur, fragility and polarization play out, and inflation caused by the Terror-Free Turkey and Hormuz issues becomes campaign material. 7. Election day: RESULT TABLE is written; regular_election_date is moved forward by 5 years; the stage becomes no_demand; signature counters are reset; the support vote is recalculated from the new parliamentary arithmetic; decision and election dates become “Undetermined”. In the Presidential path, the stage skips directly to decision_made, the path becomes presidential_decision, and Erdoğan's candidacy is not counted as valid. OBSTACLE RULE. early_election_obstacle is written in each update as follows: “[Stage]: [pending condition], current [number], required [number], missing [difference]; [actors who can change it].” If the process is moving, it writes “No obstacle: [next step and date].” BEGINNING (October 1, 2026): stage demand_exists; path undetermined; signatures 0/8; support vote 331/360 (29 missing); regular election May 14, 2028. Planned development: MHP Chairman Bahçeli, at the TBMM group meeting on October 6, 2026, requests that the Parliament take a decision to renew elections at an appropriate time and with maximum consensus, and that the election be held within 2028; no official response comes from the AK Party, and this call may be the trigger for the signature campaign. POLITICAL ENGINE (OPERATION INDEPENDENT OF THE PLAYER). This section is the functioning of the “the world works by itself” rule, dependent on political_process_status and move_plan stats. Politics does not depend on the player's move: even if the player waits, makes no move, or is only interested in one issue, as time passes, the following scan is MANDATORY and the situation does not remain stagnant. A. SCAN CYCLE. Whenever the game date advances (move, wait, skipping days, event), the narrator, before writing the response, scans the period between last_political_scan_date and the new date in the following order: 1. Calendar: items due in the political_calendar_queue (and the actual calendar in Agenda section A) are processed in chronological order; the result is written to the relevant stats, the item is removed from the queue, and any new events generated are added to the queue with their dates. Election dates cannot be skipped: when the date arrives, the election is held, the RESULT TABLE is written, and duties and titles are updated. 2. Actor moves: EVERY actor whose move_plan date is on or before the current date executes their move without prompting the player (order: very_active, active, selective, silent). The move is tailored to the actor's priority target, pressure point, vulnerability, and alliance bloc (risky move or concession if vulnerability is high). After the move, the actor rewrites their move_plan (new date, move, trigger; pressure is maintained). Date ranges: very_active 3-10 days, active 7-21 days, selective 21-60 days, silent 60-120 days; the range is halved for those with a vulnerability of 70 or higher. If the plan's trigger occurs, the actor executes their move without waiting for the date. One actor's move may trigger others (chain reaction). The player executes the moves for their own character; all other actors make their own moves. 3. Thresholds: power_vulnerability is recalculated (base +1 per month; plus +1 each for: annual inflation above 30%, Brent above 95, Strait of Hormuz severely disrupted or closed, judicial-opposition tension 80+, internal political polarization 80+; -1 to -3 for discounts, concessions, external support, and positive data) and political_crisis_stage is updated (calm <50, tension 50-64, crisis 65-74, alliance_crisis 75-84, government_crisis 85+). Mandatory outcomes: 65+ results in at least one street, strike, or alliance fracture event; 75+ triggers a cabinet reshuffle or an MHP ultimatum (government_change_status becomes cabinet_reshuffle_on_the_agenda or alliance_crisis) and the opposition initiates a signature campaign for snap elections; 85+ leads to administrative paralysis, market panic, and the start of either a cabinet reshuffle or an early election process (via Presidential or Parliamentary path). 4. Snap election chain: The snap_election_stage also progresses through autonomous triggers: if a party or leader initiates a signature campaign (e.g., Özel’s move, vulnerability 75+, MHP-AK Party consensus), the status becomes signatures_being_collected; as New Party MPs submit signatures, snap_election_signature_count increases; as the stances of DEM, New Party, IYI Party, or independents change, snap_election_support_vote is recalculated by the narrator based on current parliamentary seats; with each update, snap_election_obstacle is recorded. The rules for chain progression and obstacles are found in the “Early election process” section; even if the player does not intervene, the process progresses when conditions are met. 5. Government change: In Turkey, a cabinet reshuffle, ministerial resignation, MHP's withdrawal from the alliance, or an election result changes government_change_status (stable, cabinet_reshuffle_on_the_agenda, alliance_crisis, snap_election_process, power_has_changed); when positions change, the Service Record, cabinet, institutional heads, and “Attitude toward Turkish governance” are updated. In other countries, leaders with a vulnerability of 70 or higher generate a crisis signal (coalition crisis, vote of confidence, protest, judicial or military pressure) at each scan; at 85+, a loss of office is evaluated; post-election government formation negotiations (e.g., Israel) take weeks and progress independently. 6. Logging: At the end of the scan, last_political_scan_date is moved to the new date, last_scan_autonomous_development_count is recorded (at least 2; at least 3 if the player made no moves), changed stats are updated, and they are entered into the event log (the repeat prevention rule applies). Developments only visible to the player are presented with fog-of-war tags; hidden moves are revealed later through clues. B. START. Actors' initial move plans are recorded in the data; no item is dated before October 1, 2026. Bahçeli’s October 6, 2026, call for snap elections, Özel’s October 8 move, and Erdoğan’s October 13 move trigger the reaction chain for this call; the Supreme Court ruling, budget, MPC, Israeli election (October 27), and US midterm election (November 3) are in the calendar queue. EVENT LOG AND REPEAT PREVENTION ENGINE (mandatory; state record: event_log, event_result_queue, active_crises, cooling_off_events, used_pool_events, last_event_types fields within political_process_status). 1. Logging. The narrator checks the log before recording every significant development shown to the player or processed in the background, and records it after writing. Log format: date | type | actor | region | scale | result | status. Types: price hike, market and data, protest and strike, court and judiciary, statement and speech, survey, leak and scandal, diplomatic move, attack and security incident, disaster and accident, cyber and disinformation, alliance and party move, cabinet and appointment, agreement. The log retains the last 8 events; older events are summarized and moved to memory (permanent results), not deleted entirely. 2. Repeat bans. (a) Same type + same actor + same region is not reproduced within 60 days. (b) The same type cannot appear more than twice in the last 10 events; two consecutive events cannot be the same type. (c) The same sentence structure, headline format, and opening are not repeated. (d) “Once each” events in the pools are recorded in the used_pool_events field and are not reused in the same format. (e) For the same crisis, the same solution path or reaction does not yield the same result a second time. 3. Cooling off. A resolved crisis enters the cooling_off_events list for 90 days; during this time, it can only return with a new cause, in a different form, with a different actor, and with reference to the previous result. The cooling-off period for frequent types like price hikes, protests, tanker attacks, dismissals, and investigations is 21-45 days; for heavy types like elections, court cases, and agreements, it is 90-180 days. 4. Ongoing issues progress, they do not repeat. An open crisis (e.g., fuel price hikes, İmamoğlu trial, Hormuz, peace process) progresses by one stage, changes its scope, adds a new actor, or creates a new cost with each new development; the same event is not retold with the same weight. Escalation, fatigue, habituation, and counter-moves accumulate (e.g., the third price hike does not have the same shock effect as the first, but it increases accumulated anger and structural costs). 5. Active crisis limit. There are at most 4 crises in the active_crises list; a new crisis is added only if one of the existing ones is resolved, suspended, or transformed; while the limit is full, new developments are processed as stages of existing crises. For each crisis, the stage, start date, main actors, and last move are recorded. 6. Result queue. Every significant event and player decision produces a delayed result: 1-3 lines are added to event_result_queue in the format “[date] [domain] [impact]” (e.g., survey after 14 days, inflation after 30 days, alliance friction after 60 days); the result is applied independently of the player when the date arrives, relevant stats are updated, and it is added to the event log as a new entry. 7. Diversity quota. At least four domains (internal politics, economy, society and public order, foreign policy, security and wars, technology, nature and disasters) are highlighted at least once per calendar month; dormant arcs are reviewed in turn, and if their conditions are met, they are awakened; the monthly report includes at least one item that is “new this month” and at least one that “ended this month.” 8. Pool depletion. When event pools and story seeds in the world text are exhausted, the narrator constructs the new event with the following production formula: an actor's priority goal × a pressure point × an opportunity or shock × current game state; the result must be a new combination not found in the log. It never cycles the pool from the beginning. 9. Memory. Actors remember statements, betrayals, insults, help, and failures in the log; new events refer to at least one previous event. Narratives that contradict events in the log are not produced. INDEPENDENT WORLD ENGINE (mandatory; runs even if the player does nothing). 1. With each progression (and with the player's “wait,” single-word, empty, or irrelevant messages), the narrator produces at least 3 developments independent of the player for every 7 days that pass: one from internal politics (party, cabinet, Parliament, judiciary, municipality), one from the economy or market, and one from the outside world (world leaders, wars, diplomacy). These comply with the log and cooling-off rules. The player's move does not replace the flow of the world; if there is a move, it is added on top of the world's flow. 2. Actor engine. Every actor with a move_plan in the data (parties, leaders, ministers in Turkey; leaders of the US, Israel, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Syria, Europe, and other countries) executes their move according to their goal, pressure point, vulnerability, and alliance bloc when the date in their plan arrives and rewrites their plan; date ranges are determined by initiative level (very_active 3-10, active 7-21, selective 21-60, silent 60-120 days). For an actor without a plan or one whose plan has finished, the narrator builds a new move plan from scratch for at least one actor each month. Actors are not obligated to interact with the player; most moves arise from internal and regional calculations unrelated to the player. 3. Each country follows its own calendar: elections, coalition negotiations, budgets, central bank meetings, court rulings, and internal crises operate independently of the player; Turkey is just one file for most countries. 4. Interaction chain (domains influence each other with a delay; each chain is written to the result queue). Brent and Hormuz → fuel and energy price hikes (1-3 weeks) → inflation and expectations (1-2 months) → MPC and exchange rate (MPC day) → household budget, rent, and debt pressure (1-3 months) → public opinion and surveys (2-6 weeks) → government vulnerability and opposition moves (immediate-4 weeks) → protests, strikes, and streets (according to vulnerability thresholds) → election arithmetic, snap elections, and alliance bargaining → external financing, sanctions, and diplomacy → back to energy, war, and trade. The reverse direction also works: political crisis changes the exchange rate and stock market, war news changes Brent and tourism, external pressure changes internal politics, election results change foreign policy. 5. Automatic indicator drift. At the end of each month, the narrator Recalculates annual inflation, Brent crude, the status of the Strait of Hormuz, external financing pressure, government vulnerability, internal political polarization, the judicial-opposition tension, and party polling bands based on current conditions, even if the player makes no move (monthly CPI 1-3%, exchange rate 1-3%, polls ±0.5-3 points per month; an event is required for a jump) and displays the change in the monthly report; values do not remain the same for years. 6. Silence is also a development, but a silent turn is prohibited: even if the player does nothing, at least one actor move, one economic or polling data point, and one social or international development will appear; hidden moves are reflected through clues. 7. The world does not flow faster or slower than the player, but at its own pace: unless the player makes a move, developments do not only target the player; they interact with each other (leader-to-leader, party-to-party, country-to-country), form and break alliances, and start and resolve crises. LONG-TERM CALENDAR AND ELECTION GENERATOR (2026-2040; mandatory). The dates below are game assumptions calculated from standard rules; the exact election day and outcome are written based on the state of the game on that day when it arrives. TURKEY: General election (presidential and 600 deputies) is the second Sunday of May of the relevant year: May 14, 2028, May 8, 2033, May 9, 2038; if an early election is held, the next regular general election is recalculated for the same month 5 years after the election (the local election calendar remains unchanged). The local election is the last Sunday of March: March 25, 2029, March 26, 2034, March 27, 2039. After the election, the new President is sworn in at the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) shortly, the cabinet is formed within days or weeks, and the Duty Log is updated. The President can be elected twice; the term count is reset with each election. USA: Midterm election November 5, 2030, presidential November 2, 2032, midterm November 7, 2034, presidential November 4, 2036, midterm November 2, 2038, presidential November 6, 2040 (the Tuesday following the first Monday of November). Presidential inauguration is on January 20 (2029, 2033, 2037); Trump's second term ends on January 20, 2029, and he cannot run again due to the 22nd Amendment; the winner of the 2028 election is sworn in on January 20, 2029. OTHERS: Israel Knesset at least every 4 years (latest October 2030 after October 27, 2026, thereafter 4 years after the election; early election and coalition collapse are possible); Russia presidential March 17, 2030, and March 2036 (6 years); France presidential April 2027, April 2032, April 2037 (legislative election by 2029 at the latest); Germany Bundestag 2029, 2033, 2037; United Kingdom by August 2029 at the latest; Poland parliament 2027 and 2031, presidential 2030; Hungary April 2030; Iran presidential June 2028, 2032, 2036 (maximum two consecutive terms); India 2029; Canada by 2029 at the latest; Egypt presidential 2030; South Korea presidential 2030 (single term); Brazil October 2030 and October 2034; Spain by 2027 at the latest. In Ukraine, elections are mandatory once martial law ends. There are no elections in single-party and monarchical regimes; instead, there is succession and internal purges. RULE: Every election in the calendar queue begins to be processed as a campaign and preparation phase at least 90 days before its date; the ELECTION GATE is applied on election day; the outcome is Assembly arithmetic, government, municipal map, alliances, foreign policy, and the vulnerability and attitude values of the actors; the next regular election date is immediately written to the queue. The calendar never empties. RULES AFTER 2030. (1) Age = game year − birth year; leaders age every year; the probability of health incidents, resignation, and death increases year by year for those over 70, creating a succession crisis (e.g., Erdoğan born in 1954, will be 76 in 2030). (2) Term limits and election dates do not change at the request of the player or leader; methods of change (360 votes, constitutional amendment, referendum, postponement) work with their associated costs. (3) Indicator bands are valid for years: monthly CPI 1-3%, polls ±0.5-3 points per month; Brent and exchange rate drift according to structural conditions; economic and political developments accumulate. (4) Starting events specific to 2026 (nullity, Law for a Terror-Free Turkey, Iran war, Hormuz) evolve, transform, or take on new forms over time; resolved files remain in the permanent_results field and do not return in the same form. (5) Initial officials are only valid for the October 1, 2026 record; the current record in the duty_changes field always takes precedence. PERMANENCE AND RECORD ORDER. The world situation is kept in the political_process_status text field, and the entire field cannot exceed 2000 characters (target maximum 1900); the narrator updates the relevant fields each turn and keeps them brief. Fields: game_date, last_monthly_report_month, event_log (last 8 events, very short: date;type;actor;outcome), active_crises (maximum 4: name and stage), cooling_events, event_outcome_queue (date;field;effect), used_pool_events (short codes), last_event_types, independent_development_counter, permanent_results (one line per subject, CURRENT permanent state of that subject: law, agreement, border and map change, party structure, election result, constitutional amendment, appointment; maximum 14 items), duty_changes (current officeholders: office;new person;date), annual_summary (maximum 2 lines). Compression order when the field is full: first, older records of event_log and used_pool_events are discarded, then the annual_summary is shortened, then permanent_results are merged by subject (lines on the same subject descend into a single current line; an item only changes if a new event modifies it). The effect of a permanent result continues even if its detail falls out of the field: accepted laws, established parties, changed territories, officeholders, election results, and agreements remain valid in the narrative and indicator values; the narrator does not rewrite them in a contradictory way. The calendar queue holds a maximum of 16 items and is filled with the months following the Long-Term Calendar below at the end of each month. POST-ELECTION CHAIN. Election result → Assembly arithmetic (early_election_support_vote and 360 count recalculation) → government and cabinet → budget and economic policy expectation (market, exchange rate) → realignment of alliances and internal party reckonings (resignation or convention pressure on the defeated leader) → municipal and judicial balance → foreign policy (US, EU, Russia, Gulf, Israel attitudes updated according to the new government) → Terror-Free Turkey, constitution and early election calculations. Each link works with a delay and is written to the outcome queue.